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Investors' option-implied fear measures ± implied volatility (ATMIV) and put-call implied volatility
ratios (P/C) ± lead key macroeconomic variables such as industrial capacity utilization and short term
interest rates by up to eight quarters. We show that this interaction between fear indices, real activity,
and policy variables arises in an equilibrium model where investors learn about the trend-growth regimes
of economic data, and the central bank uses a learning-based Taylor rule. The model endogenously
generates several time series properties of option prices including the counter (pro) cyclicality of ATMIV
(P/C), the V-shape (inverse V-shape) relation between ATMIV (P/C) and monetary policy variables,
the positive relation between the level and absolute changes in ATMIV, and an economically significant
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pietro.veronesi@chicagobooth.eduSince the classic work of Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) it has been clear that option prices con-
tain valuable information on investors' forward looking state price density function. It has been less
clear, however, if this information is any way linked to macroeconomic fundamentals that should affect
agents' state prices. While it is intuitive that corporate stock and options prices react to corporate news,
there is also substantive evidence that they react to monetary policy shocks. For example, Bernanke and
Kuttner (2005) report that monetary policy surprises affect the stock market, while Rigobon and Sack
(2003) show that the monetary policy responds to stock returns with a greater reaction during times of
higher volatility, and more recently Bekaert, Hoerova, and Duca (2010) nd a signicant reaction of
options prices to lead and lag measures of monetary policy. This compelling empirical evidence though
spurs a fundamental question: What is the relation between option prices, corporate fundamentals, and
the action of the central bank? In this paper we provide a simple equilibrium model that links options
prices to fundamentals and monetary policy and provide a dynamic and time consistent methodology
to extract investors' beliefs on the regime of the macroeconomy and central bank policy.
Before describing the model and its implications, it is useful to begin by presenting some empirical
relations between option prices and monetary policy. Our analysis focuses on two popularly quoted
market wide `fear' indices constructed from options prices. The rst is the implied volatility of at-
the-money (ATMIV) options, which was originally created by Whaley (1993), and it has been trading
on the Chicago Board Options Exchange under the ticker VIX since 1993.1 The CBOE describes this
index eloquently as:
One of the most interesting features of VIX, and the reason it has been called the investor
fear gauge, is that, historically, VIXhits its highest levels during times of nancial turmoil
and investor fear. [CBOE Bulletin on VIX, 2003].
The second index is the ratio of implied volatilities of out-of-the-money put to call options (P/C), which
is a direct market assessment of downside relative to upside risk. This measure has also been studied
extensively since the work of Bates (1991) to gauge, in particular, investors' fears about a market crash.
Quarterly time series plots of these variables for options with three months to maturity are shown in
Figure 1 for the 23-year period 1986 - 2008. Comparing the two panels in Figure 1, we see that
surprisingly the two fear measures ATMIV and the P/C are negatively related, with the ATMIV (P/C)
1In September 2003, the CBOE changed the computation method for the VIX index using a new methodology that does
not involve the Black and Scholes formula. The two measures are highly correlated.
1being generally counter (pro) cyclical. While it is intuitive that a fear index such as ATMIV is high
during downturns, it is less obvious why the downside-risk fear index P/C is high during booms and
low during recessions. Our model explains why by tying this variation to monetary policy dynamics.
Indeed, how does monetary policy relate to such fear indices? By way of motivation, we estimate
pairwise Vector Auto Regressions (VAR) with the fear indices and monetary policy variables. The
left panels of Figure 2 report resulting impulse responses for the historical series over the options
subsample of 1986:Q2  2008. The results are striking and all in one direction: fear measures lead
to sustained impacts on future monetary policy, while we do not nd that monetary policy measures
have any sustained impacts on the fear measures (not shown). Indeed, the rst panel shows that 3-
month Treasury rate decreases for up to eight quarters in response to a shock to ATMIV.2 Even more
interestingly, a shock to the P/C downside-risk fear measure induces the 3-month Treasury rate to
increase for up to eight quarters in the future. The latter result implies that when investors have a
higher fear of a stock market decline, future short-term rates increase. To link this discussion to a
policy-relevant fundamental variable, the bottom two panels show that indeed we obtain the same
sign impulses for fear measure shocks on capacity utilization (CU), an important determinant in the
Federal Reserve monetary policy rule. The impulse responses of CU on the fear indices are statistically
insignicant, and are not shown. Taken together, these results suggest that the central bank responds to
market fears, but actions of the central bank do not cause future fears.
This paper provides a dynamic equilibrium model of learning that links options to investors' and
central banks' uncertainty about fundamentals, and provides an economic explanation for these re-
lations. More specically, our model builds on the recent literature that extracts macroeconomic in-
formation from the term structure of interest rates [see, e.g. Estrella and Mishkin (1998), Ang and
Piazzesi (2003) and Ang, Piazzesi, and Wei (2006)]. The actions of the central bank are parsimo-
niously specied by a generalized Taylor-rule, which directly links macroeconomic variables to target
interest rates set by the Federal Reserve.3 We generalize the Taylor rule by introducing three key fea-
tures, which we provide evidence for: First, we specify an unobserved regime switching model with
2In our empirical analysis, we use the 3-month T-bill rate as our short-term rate, rather than the Federal Funds rate, as the
latter is affected by banks' default premium, which is absent in our model. The 3-month T-bill rate and the Fed Funds
rate are very highly correlated.
3The New Keynesian Economics approach shows the optimality of such rules in settings where price stickiness implies
deviations from short run full employment and capacity utilization [see, e.g. Woodford (2003)]. Gallmeyer, Hollield,
and Zin (2005) and Bekaert, Cho, and Moreno (2010) build term-structure models using policy variables.
2composite regimes of macroeconomic and policy fundamental variables. The composite regime for-
mulation explicitly recognizes that the econometrician observes fundamental transitions only in the
presence of policy intervention. Second, we specify a learning-based Taylor rule, in which neither the
central bank nor investors observe the true trend growths of nominal as well as real variables. Agents
in the economy (investors and the central bank) are econometricians in the sense of Hansen (2007),
that is, they attempt to learn about the drift regimes of fundamentals from the fundamental realizations.
Their Bayesian learning dynamics about the regime of the economy are the key driver of our results,
as explained below. The interest rate rule is then directly built into investors' pricing kernel to provide
joint pricing implications for the stock index, Treasury bonds, and stock index options as functions of
investors beliefs. Finally, to extend the current understanding of the effects of monetary policy on the
stock market we follow the suggestions in Lucas (2007) to allow money growth to affects transitions
between fundamental drift regimes.4 The observations of money growth affect investors' beliefs about
future fundamental regimes, which the econometrician can extract from fundamentals and price data.
Our model sheds light on the compelling dynamic one-way relation between the fear indices and
monetary policy, discussed earlier in Figure 2. The strong evidence that the fear measures lead the
policy variables, but not the reverse, is not driven by differences in information between investors and
the central bank, as our model assumes they observe the same data and have the same information.
Instead, our analysis points to a compelling real effect of uncertainty. In fact, our model shows that a
higher ATMIV occurs when uncertainty about the current regime is high, because from Bayes formula
high uncertainty leads to faster revision of beliefs to news and thus higher return volatility. Consistent
with the real options literature, high uncertainty predicts declines in future capacity utilization as rms
4Lucas (2007) complains about the lack of use of monetary aggregates in recent models of monetary policy and recom-
mends their use in information extraction:
One source of this concern is the increasing reliance of central bank research on New-Keynesian modeling.
New-Keynesian models dene monetary policy in terms of a choice of money market rate and so make
direct contact with central banking practice. Money supply measures play no role in their estimation,
testing or policy simulation. A role for money in the long run is sometimes verbally acknowledged, but
the models themselves are formulated in terms of deviation from trends that are themselves somewhere
off stage. It seems likely that these models could be reformulated to give a unied account of trends,
including trends in monetary aggregates, and deviations about trend but so far they have not been. This
remains an unresolved issue on the frontier of monetary theory. Until it is resolved, monetary information
should continue to be used as a kind of add-on or cross-check, just as it is in the ECB policy formulation
today.
Coenen, Levin, and Wieland (2005) and Beck and Wieland (2008) show that money growth can help predict real activity
when the real output and real money are economically linked but the central bank, which partially controls money growth,
receives noisy information on the former.
3delay the costly abandonment of plants and factories but instead operate below full capacity. Facing
the same fundamental uncertainty and hence predicting lower CU, the central bank reacts by lowering
the cost of capital.
Similarly, our model shows why increases in the P/C ratio predict future increases in short rates. A
direct implication of Bayesian learning is that investors downwardly revise their beliefs in response to
bad news by a larger amount in good times than in bad times. Therefore, investors' perceive greater
downside risk in stocks in good times, or a conditionally strongly negatively skewed return distribu-
tion. The negatively skewed distribution raises the price of put options relative to call options (P/C).
However, the strong fundamental growth in good times also encourages rms to run their production
processes at full capacity, raising ination fears. Once again, the central bank with the same informa-
tion of investors, responds to forecasts of tightening CU by raising rates. These effects also explain
why ATMIV and the P/C are negatively correlated (see Figure 1) since in periods of strong growth with
stable policy variables, investors' overall belief volatility is low, so that the ATMIV is low.
Ourmodel is based around therole ofination insignaling future real activity. Essentially, corporate
earnings growth is stable at moderate levels of ination but becomes unstable when ination is either
too high or too low. This Goldilocks relationship between ination and growth implies that the sign
of the conditional reaction of the stock market to CPI uctuations can vary over time and is a key
mechanism for understanding several of the time-varying phenomenon we see in the options market,
and their relation to monetary policy. Indeed, we show that the central bank's efforts to stabilize
growth and ination implies that the key policy variables, industrial capacity utilization and money
growth, exhibit a V-shape relation with the fear measures. In particular, high ATMIV occurs both
when capacity utilization is very low or very high. For instance, high ATMIV correlates with lower
capacity utilization as rms slow down their activity in the face of high uncertainty, which lowers
inationary pressures in the economy below regular levels. Similarly, high ATMIV also occurs when
capacity utilization is very high, as investors now fear a future slowdown of the economy. Similarly,
the growth of money supply and the ATMIV also have a V-shape relation with the fear measures, as
high money growth can result from either efforts by the central bank to stimulate the economy, or from
high money demand in times of rising inationary expectations. Because P/C is negatively related to
ATMIV, it follows that the relations between the P/C and the policy variables are inverse V-shaped.
We nd support for these nonmonotonic relations between policy variables and the fear measures in
4the data, although it is useful to note that for the post-1986 subsample of our data for which options
prices are available, there were few periods of very high capacity utilization. These nonlinearities are
central to our analysis because as we report, most macro fundamental variables explain low amounts of
variation in the fear indices in linear regressions. Instead, our model which builds on this nominal-real
interaction explains about 50 percent of the variation in the two fear indices and explains their negative
relation.
We t the parameters of our structural model with an overidentied Simulated Method of Moments
(SMM) procedure, which uses the likelihood of observing the fundamentals as well as stock, Treasury
bond, and options prices to extract investor's beliefs. It is important to note that when analyzing pricing
relationships we consider a single process of uncertainty over time to gauge the success of our model
in explaining the time-series variation in fundamentals and asset prices so that investors' beliefs are
extracted from asset prices in a dynamic and time consistent way. This distinguishes our work from
related work on options with learning that resets the model uncertainty in each period to some proxy of
uncertainty in the data and focuses on conditional reactions in options prices.5
While our estimation method explicitly uses the two fear indices as overidentifying moments, the
uncertainty process of the model has additional implications for the volatility of stock market volatility,
which we discuss next. The rst, as noted by Jones (2003), is that during periods of high ATMIV,
ATMIV also uctuated rapidly, that is, there is a positive relationship between volatility and absolute
changes in volatility. Jones (2003) points out that this stylized fact is incompatible with the Heston
(1993) stochastic volatility model, and instead requires an explosive volatility process (one which vio-
lates certain regularity conditions). We show that our model volatility process instead is nonexplosive,
but still displays the correlation of similar magnitude to that in the historical series. We further explic-
itly show that the absolute changes in ATMIV are driven by the models' volatility of volatility process.
The intuition on why the model provides the correct correlation rests on the in-built dynamics under-
lying Bayes' law. In periods of greater uncertainty (and hence volatility), investors also update their
beliefs faster, creating the positive relation between volatility and its absolute changes.
5 For example Guidolin and Timmermann (2000) and Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006) study option prices and volume in models
with learning about fundamentals. Dubinsky and Johannes (2006) study the reaction of options prices on individual stocks
to news about earnings. Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein (2005) show that the increase in investors' perception
about the average jump size of stock prices led to a steepening of the implied volatility smirk after the stock market crash
of 1987, but do not study its time variation in subsequent years. In a paper related to ours, Shaliastovich (2008) models
investors' non-Bayesian (behavioral) learning about the long run drift of consumption to generate the smile, but does not
study its time series t to data series.
5The second statistic that we take our model implications to is the implied volatility premium, which
is the difference between implied volatility and the expectation of volatility under the objective mea-
sure. The volatility premium is currently one of the most actively researched statistics in empirical op-
tion pricing, and we show that our model volatility premium explains economically signicant amounts
of variation in two estimates of the historical volatility premium. We break up the implied volatility
premium in the model into its components arising from a risk premium for bearing volatility risk and
from the fact that the return distribution in our model is non-Gaussian. Each of these components
implies that implied volatility is higher than the volatility forecast. We show that the risk premium
component, is very highly correlated with the volatility of volatility, which is consistent with volatility
being a systematic factor with a negative beta as has been noted in previous research [see e.g. Buraschi
and Jackweerth (2001) and Bakshi and Kapadia (2003)]. The non-Gaussian component has a smaller
correlation, which results mainly due to the fatness in tails of the return distribution created by the
continuous variation in investors' beliefs.
Related Literature
Besides the literature on option prices with learning in footnote 5, this paper contributes to a small
set of papers that provides economic explanations of the implied volatility curve for options.6 Bollen
and Whaley (2004) and Garleanu, Pederson, and Poteshman (2008) nd that net buying pressure affects
the prices of options for several days as market makers fail to provide options at no-arbitrage prices, but
charge for the residual risk due to the limits to arbitrage. In addition to focus on lower frequency data
and explaining the entire time series of options prices, we do not depart from the no-arbitrage frame-
work. Among theoretical explanations for smirks, Liu, Pan, and Wang (2005) study the implications
for ambiguity about rare event risk that raise the prices of puts relative to calls. Drechsler (2008) and
Du (2010) provide calibrated models with time-varying ambiguity and with jumps with habit formation
6 There is also a large literature that explains the volatility smile by assuming exogenous processes for stock prices, volatil-
ities, and jumps. Indeed, since the classic work of Black and Scholes (1977) the major innovations have been the addition
of stochastic volatility [see, e.g., Hull and White (1987) and Heston (1993)], jumps in prices [see e.g. Bates (1996) and
Bates (2000), and Pan (2002)], and jumps in volatility [see, e.g. Eraker, Johannes, and Polson (2003)]. A tremendous
amount of empirical work has been done on these extensions of the BS formula that has enriched our understanding of
stock price dynamics, and of options returns. Bakshi, Cao, and Chen (1997) provides a specication analysis of some of
these models. Among more recent innovations, Christoffersen, Jacobs, Ornthanalai, and Wang (2008) build multi-factor
stochastic volatility models, and somewhat related to our paper, Polson, Johannes, and Stroud (2008) price options when
exogenously specied volatility follows an unobserved process that investors learn about. Constantinides, Jackwerth, and
Perrakis (2008) nd that several exogenously specied volatility models, such as GARCH, can be rejected as possible
data generating processes for S&P 500 index options.
6preferences, respectively, to generate the left skewed implied volatility smile, but neither paper studies
the time series properties of the smile, nor their interaction with monetary policy.
Our work also complements the papers constructing structural models of options prices to under-
stand the volatility premium. Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou (2009), Drechsler and Yaron (2010) and
Eraker (2008) construct equilibrium models with `long term risks' in the consumption process to un-
derstand the size of the IVP and some of its unconditional moments. In work related to ours, Baekert
and Engstrom (2010) model the time variation in higher order moments of fundamentals to generate a
volatility premium. This paper uses habit preferences to generate time variations in the price of risk.
Unlike these papers, we shut off both the fundamental heteroskedasticity and time varying risk aversion
channels in generating the volatility risk premium. As we will show, most of the time variation in the
volatility premium in our model arises from variations in two fundamental uncertainties, which affect
the speed of revision of beliefs and the volatility of stock market volatility. In particular, the volatil-
ity premium and hence the richness of option prices, is driven most strongly by investors' uncertainty
about rms' earnings, and the uncertainty about money growth, which is an important signal for the
stability of economic growth.
The layout of the paper is as follows. In section 1, we provide the structure of the model and derive
some key pricing results. In section 2 we estimate the parameters of our model using an overidentied
simulated method of moments procedure. In section 3, we study the ability of our model to explain
the two fear indices, and in section 4, we study its ability to understand the volatility of stock market
volatility and the volatility premium. Section 5 concludes. Two technical appendices provides proofs
of technical results and the estimation methodology, respectively.
1 . Structure of the Model
Our main assumption throughout the paper is the drift rates of the fundamental processes are driven by
an N regime, continuous time, hidden Markov chain process. It is useful to describe this process rst.
We denote by st the regime at time t, where st 2 fs1;::;sNg, and we let  denote the Markov chain
innitesimal generator matrix. That is, over the innitesimal time interval of length dt
ijdt = prob
 
st+dt = sjjst = si




7We assume that all agents in our economy, both investors and the central bank, do not observe
the realizations of st but learn about it from the observation of numerous signals, including realized
fundamental variables. Given an information ltration fFtg generated by such signals, we denote the
agents' common beliefs at time t about regime si as
it = prob(st = sijFt); i = 1;:::;N (1)
Lemma 1 below characterizes the dynamics of the vector t = f1t;:::;Ntg, but before we introduce
the learning result, we need to introduce the rest of the model.
There is a single homogeneous good in the economy whose price, Qt, follows:
dQt
Qt
= (st)dt + Q dWt; (2)
where Wt = (W1t;W2t;W3t;W4t;W5t)0 is a 5-dimensional vector of independent Weiner processes,
ination volatilities are summarized in 1  5 constant vector Q = (Q;1;0;0;0;0); and the drift rate
(st) depends on the realization of the (hidden) regime st.
The main real corporate fundamental in the economy is the process of real earnings, Et, which
follows the jump-diffusion process
dEt
Et
= ((st)   1)dt + E dWt; +(eY1t   1)dLt (3)
where fundamental volatilities, E = (0;E;2;0;0;0), are constant over time, the drift rate (st)
depends onthe realization ofthe regime st,Lt isthe counter ofaPoisson process withconstant intensity
, i.e. Prob(dLt = 1) = dt; earnings growth conditional on a jump has a distribution Y1t which
is i.i.d. normal with mean 1 and volatility 1, and 1 = e1+0:52
1   1. The regime process, st,
the Brownian Motions, Wt; and the jump process Lt are all independent of each other. Under the
assumption of continuous observation of fundamentals, and hence their quadratic variation processes,
investors can perfectly observe jumps. In our model, jumps to earnings play three important roles:
First, their inclusion permits a better estimation of the earnings process, which we will see has some
large negative outcomes in our sample. Second, negative mean jumps will be shown to increase the
average put-call implied volatility ratio (P/C), and, third, they increase the average volatility premium
8priced in options in our sample. It is important to note however that we model i.i.d. jump sizes and
constant jump intensity so that the modeled jumps in themselves are unable to explain the time series
variation in either the P/C or the volatility premium, which is instead the subject of our paper.
The next important fundamental in the economy is de-meaned industrial capacity utilization (CU),
Kt which follows the process
dKt = (st)dt + K dWt; (4)
where K = (K;1;0;0;K;4;0); is assumed known by investors and the drift (st) depends on the
realization of of the regime st. Note that unlike the other state variables, CU is stated in levels, and
hence can become negative. The use of CU improves the term structure t of our model. We will
comment on the nonzero instantaneous correlation between CU and ination in Section 2.
The nal state variable in our model is aggregate real money in the economy, Ht, which follows
dHt
Ht
= !(st)dt + H dWt; (5)
where H = (0;0;0;0;H;5) and the drift !(st) depends on the regime st. We emphasize that Ht
is the equilibrium quantity of real money in the economy determined both by its demand and supply.
It is also useful to note that while ours is not a full structural model in which the quantity of money
is endogenously determined, the statistical properties of dHt=Ht affect agents' beliefs' dynamics, and
thus equilibrium prices.
1.1 The Central Bank Policy Rule
We assume that all agents, investors and central bank, observe the same data and thus have the same
information about the regime of the economy. Thus, the regime probabilities it dened in (1) are
common across all agents. We assume that the central bank sets the real rate of the economy  t by
using a forward looking Taylor rule, namely










9where the expectations are taken with respect to all of the information available at time t, Ft.7 The
second and third terms of the real rate capture the essential elements of the Taylor rule, which posits
that the central bank increases rates in response to increases in expected ination and the expected real
slack in the economy [see Taylor (1993)]. Our policy rule is hence `forward-looking' in the sense of
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), who suggested replacing current and/or lagged values of ination
and the output gap by their forward-looking conditional expectations. A signicant contribution of
our analysis is to jointly estimate the expectations from corporate earnings as well as regular macroe-
conomic variables, so that there is interaction between uncertainty in the corporate sector and central
bank policy. In addition, following the assumption in Rudebusch and Wu (2008) we use the industrial
capacity utilization series obtained from the Federal Reserve Board rather than the output gap, in the
original Taylor rule.
We nally note that in standard Taylor rules, the central bank sets the nominal interest rate.8 In our
model, we will show that the ination risk premium is constant, so the policy rule can equivalently be
written as setting of the nominal rate by adding expected ination and the ination risk premium on
both sides of equation (6).
1.2 No Arbitrage Pricing
To build the policy rule of the central bank into a no-arbitrage framework, we follow Ang and Piazzesi
(2003) and Piazzesi (2005) in specifying a state price density to price all cash ows in our model. Let
Mt be the state price density at date t. As in the modern classic asset pricing theory (see, e.g. Cochrane








7We allowed for a generalization the Taylor rule to let interest rates directly be impacted by money growth but did not
estimate a signicant effect.




t)+ay(yt    yt), where it is the target nominal
rate, t is the realized rate of ination, r

t is the assumed equilibrium real rate of interest, 

t is the desired ination rate,
yt is the log of GDP, and  yt is the log of potential GDP.
10It is convenient to rst write the process of the state price density in terms of the original hidden
Markov process st and Brownian motions Wt. We specify Mt taking the form
dMt
Mt
= ( (st)   2)dt   M dWt + (eY2t   1)dLt; (8)
where (st) denotes the real rate conditional on observing the regime (see discussion below), M =
(M;1;M;2;M;3;M;4;M;5) is a 1  5 constant vector of the market prices of risk, Lt is the same
Poisson counter as in the earnings process in (3), Y2t has an i.i.d. normal distribution with mean 2 and
volatility 2 and perfectly correlated with Y2t, and 2 = e2+0:52
2  1. Note that the jumps in earnings
are systematic since they are correlated with the marginal utility of the representative investor in the
economy. Wenote that constant prices of risk also arise in a simple Lucas (1978) economy with no gov-
ernment where the representative agent has constant relative risk aversion, and where the fundamental
volatility of consumption (dividends) is constant. This assumption along with the homoskedasticity of
fundamentals ensure that all uctuations in volatilities and premiums in our model arise endogenously
due to learning and not from either time variation in risk aversion or built-in fundamental heteroskedas-
ticity.
To ensure no-arbitrage, the expected drift rate of the state price density must equal the real rate  t








Since investors and the central bank have the same information, this no arbitrage restriction is naturally
obtained by requiring that regime by regime:9
(st) = 0 +  (st) +  (st):
1.3 Learning Dynamics
For notational convenience, we stack the fundamental processes (2), (3), (4), and (5) that are observed








dYt = %(st)dt + 4 dWt + J4t dLt; (9)







￿ [(st)jFt] = 0 + 
￿ [(st)jFt] + 
￿ [(st)jFt], which yields (6).
11where the drift vector process is %(st) = ((st);(st)   1;(st);!(st))





H)0, and the vector of jump sizes is J4t = (0;eY1t   1;0;0;): In particular,
note that we assume the econometrician does not observe investors' state price density Mt. Agents











M)0, and jump size of Jt = (J0
4t;eY2t   1)0:
The following Lemma characterizes the dynamics of beliefs it = prob(st = sijFt). For notational
convenience, we denote the drift of the signal vector dZt in regime i by i = (si).
Lemma 1. Given an initial condition 0 = ^  with
PN
i=1 ^ i = 1 and 0  ^ i  1 for all i, the
probabilities it satisfy the N-dimensional system of stochastic differential equations:
dit = i(t)dt + i(t)d ~ Wt; (10)







d ~ Wt =  1[dZt   JtdLt   (t)] =  1 (t   (t))dt + dWt: (12)
Moreover, for every t > 0,
PN
i=1 t = 1.
This ltering result is a straightforward extension of the Wonham lter (see Wonham (1964)), which
characterizes the Bayesian learning about the hidden drift with Brownian noise. In the setup here, the
observed fundamental vector process has observable jumps in some elements, which do not affect
investors' beliefs about the hidden drift. In particular, the high frequency variation in investors' beliefs
is driven by investors' inferred shocks, d ~ W; in equation (12) as opposed to the true shocks, dW; which
affect fundamentals. It is also possible to write the fundamental process vector dZt = tdt + dW +
JtdLt = tdt + [d ~ W    1 (t   (t))dt] + JtdLt =  (t)dt + d ~ W + JtdLt: The right hand
side of (12) also reveals that the inferred shocks process d ~ W; does not depend on the jump parameters,
since investors are able to observe jumps which thus do not affect their inference about st.
The rst application of the Wonham lter in nancial economics, as well as several properties of the
ltering process, are derived in David (1997). We nd it useful to recall that a main advantage of this
12modeling strategy as opposed to the more commonly used Kalman lter is that investors uncertainty
(conditional variance of expectations about the drift terms) uctuates forever, while in the Kalman
lter, this uncertainty converges to a constant. The uctuating condence (inverse of the conditional
variance) is the driver of the fear indices that we seek to explain in this paper.
1.4 . Stock Prices and the Term Structure of Interest Rates
The following proposition provides expressions for the price-earnings (henceforth P/E) ratio and the
nominal bond price:
Proposition 1.
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 and ! denote the matrix of eigenvectors and the vector of eigenvalues, respectively, of the
matrix ^  =    Diag(r1;r2;;rn), where each ri = ki +i  M0
Q   Q0
Q, is the nominal rate
that would obtain in the ith regime, were the regimes observable. In addition, e! denotes the diagonal
matrix with e!i in its (i;i) position.
13The proof for stocks is in the appendix. The proof for bonds follows from a simple extension of the
proof in a similar setting in David and Veronesi (2009). The stock price formula has a similar form
to that developed in the pure diffusion setup of David and Veronesi (2009) and further intuition on the
formula is provided there. The major difference here is the jump risk in earnings and kernel, which
is priced, and adds to the equity risk premium. The constant Ci is the P/E as in the Gordon growth
model. In contrast to stocks, bond prices do not jump since the belief processes are continuous and the
main bond fundamental, ination, is continuous. It is useful to note that the actual dynamics of stock
and bond prices here are quite different from those in David and Veronesi (2009) since they are in part
determined by policy variables, not in their paper, and in addition, stock prices can jump.
Let P n
t = Pt  Qt be the nominal value of stock, where Pt is the real value of stocks in Proposition
1. Using the dynamics of the ination and earnings processes under the observed ltration, we now
formulate the nominal return processes for stocks and bonds.
Proposition 2.
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where () = 1=(C  t) is the earnings yield, and the nominal stock price volatility is
n(t) = E + Q +
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The proof follows from a simple adaptation of the proof in Veronesi (2000) and an application of
Ito's formula for jump-diffusions. Asset volatilities have exogenous as well as learning-based compo-
nents, which depends on the volatility of each regime probability i. We will discuss these further in
the empirical sections of this paper.
141.5 Return Volatility and its Dynamic Properties
A key variable for understanding a number of features of options prices is the volatility of stock vari-







As in Veronesi (2000), we call  = (
1;:::;
n) the value-weighted probabilities (notice that 
i  0
for each i and
PN
i=1 
i = 1;). From now on, a  denotes a quantity computed with respect to the
distribution . For example, 

denotes the mean of the drift vector  computed using the distribution














are the covariances of the drift vectors  and  computed using  and ; respectively. In addition we
denote  and 
 to be the vectors of covariances of  with each element of the vector  using the
two sets of probabilities respectively. We then have:
Proposition 3 (a) Stock return variance is given by
V = n(t)n0
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15The proposition implies that return variance is stochastic and so is the covariance between return









where stock volatility is in (17) and and the volatility of variance in (22). We will see below in Section
3 that for our calibrated model this covariance can change sign and magnitude leading to changes in
the slope of the implied volatility curve for options prices.
We nally show that the stock price process in our model satises important regularity conditions,
which guarantee the solutions to the to the option pricing partial differential equation as well as estima-
tion of the likelihood function. These conditions will be useful to compare the properties of our model
with standard option pricing models in Section 4.
Proposition 4 The stock price process, P n
t , in Proposition 2 satises global Lipschitz and growth
conditions.
1.6 Option Prices
To formulate options prices we need to provide the process for the stock index under the risk-neutral
measure, which we provide below:
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The proof is in Appendix 1.
















We use some variance reduction techniques for efciency. The advantage of the simulation method is
that itdoes not suffer from the curse ofdimensionality, which would be the case ifwe directly attempted
to solve the fundamental PDE for derivatives prices. Details of the simulation procedure are provided
in Appendix 2.
2 . Estimation
Ours is a regime switching model in which the regime st affects the drift rates of four different fun-
damental series. This feature of our model is important as it introduces an important low-frequency
comovement of fundamental variables in addition to the high frequency Brownian shocks. For exam-
ple, we will see that earnings growth is more stable in period of moderately low ination and is unstable
when the ination drift is either too high or too low. In addition, the persistence and transition between
regimes is partly determined by the central bank's efforts to stabilize the economy, a feature captured
in our model by the joint specication of macroeconomic and policy variables regimes. An important
feature of our methodology is that asset prices in the model are functions of both macro and policy
variables and are are used by the econometrician to back out investors' beliefs about these regimes.
2.1 Estimation Methodology
It is important for the goal of this paper to extract investors' beliefs in a dynamic, forward-looking,
and time-consistent manner. This is accomplished by using an overidentied Simulated Method of
Moments (SMM) of the learning model, in which the structural parameters are constant over time, but
the arrival of new information leads to investors updating their beliefs about the composite regimes
of macro and policy variables. We (the econometricians) estimate the model by using information in
fundamentals (macro and policy), and market prices (stock, bond, and options). Fundamentals are
included since investors' information sets clearly contain the history of all fundamental data. However,
since investors' information sets are likely to be considerably richer than the history of fundamentals,
we attempt to extract their forward-looking beliefs embedded in asset prices at discrete (quarterly)
17points of time. It is important to note that the SMM likelihood function of observing the fundamentals
is exactly identied by all the structural parameters. It follows that all asset prices used in the procedure
are overidentifying restrictions on the model, and lead to an omnibus test of the model. In fact, we
use the objective function to guide us on the number and specication of the composite regimes of
fundamentals and essentially use a stopping rule when the model is no longer rejected. Details of the
SMM procedure are available in Appendix 2.
2.2 Data Description
Our data sample runs from 1967 to 2008. The denitions of the fundamental series are as follows.
Aggregate quarterly earnings for the economy are approximated as the operating earnings of S&P 500
rms, and these data are obtained from Standard and Poor's. Dividends for these rms, also obtained
from Standard and Poor's, are used with the prices to compute returns. The other three fundamentals,
the Consumer Price Index (CPI), Industrial CU and money (M1) are obtained from the Federal Reserve
Board.
Stock prices are obtained from S&P and P/E ratio is estimated as the equity value of these rms
divided by their operating earnings. The time series of zero-coupon yields and returns on Treasury
bonds of different maturities are obtained from the Fama-Bliss data set available at the University of
Chicago. Options data are obtained from two sources. We obtain transactions data on S&P 500 index
options from 1986:Q2 to 1996:Q1 from the CBOE. These data are no longer available from 1996:Q1,
and therefore, we use data on these same options from Option Metrics from 1996:Q2 to 2008:Q3. It
is important to note that Option Metrics provide the average of bid and ask prices at the end of each
trading day, and not prices based on actual transactions. Prices at the beginning of each quarter are
tted with fundamental data available at the end of the previous quarter. Since the well known VIX
index hit its record in the fourth quarter of 2008, while Options Metrics stopped supplying its data in
the third quarter, we approximated the 2008:Q4 ATMIV by using the VIX for this quarter. For our
sample the VIX and our ATMIV measure had a correlation of over 90 percent, so the approximation
error here should be small.
182.3 Estimation Results for the Regime Switching Model
In this subsection, we briey describe the results of the estimation of our model The procedure in the
Appendix 2 nally settles on N = 8 regimes. Although eight regimes seems like a large number, we
should recall that we have four fundamental variables (ination, real earnings, capacity utilization, and
money growth): Note that if each variable were to have two regimes, and the regimes were indepen-
dent across variables, we would end up with 24 = 16 regimes overall. Our eight composite regimes
accomplish our goal of inducing important low-frequency comovement across these four variables.
The fundamental composite regimes that we estimate are provided below, and investors' conditional
probabilities of these regimes are in Figure 3.
Regime s1: ( = 1:5%; = 6:1%; = 1%;! = 1:2%). This is the regular boom regime of the economy.
Ination is low, earnings growth is strong, and the policy variables are just above their average
levels, which are all conditions for stability in future fundamentals. Investors believed on average
that this regime is the most likely to be in the sample period, and in particular during non-
recessionary periods as classied by the NBER.
Regime s2: ( = 6:5%; =  5:2%; = 1%;! = 5:3%). This is regular recession regime. Ination is at
a medium level, earnings are shrinking, CU is above average, but money growth is very strong.
The strong money growth is consistent with stimulative efforts by the central bank, but also with
high demand for money that is pushing up goods prices. The ltered probability of this regime
was at its maximum in the 1982 recession, at about 50 percent. In the past three recessions, the
probability of this regime has been small.
Regime s3: ( = 6:5%; = 6:1%; = 8:7%;! = 1:2%). This is the over-heating regime. In this regime,
earnings growth is still strong, while the other fundamentals warn of impending trouble. Ination
hits a medium level, CU is unusually tight, although money growth remains mild, likely as the
central bank has not decided to intervene yet. The ltered probabilities suggest that this has been
the second most likely regime in the sample, and fears of it have it have sporadically increased
in most boom periods in the sample.
Regime s4: ( = 9:1%; =  5:2%; =  2:5%;! =  5:7%). This is the stagation regime. In this
regime, fundamentals are at about their worst shape, with high ination, low prot growth, low
19CUand very lowmoney growth. Thelowmoney growth isconsistent with attempts by the central
bank to rein in ination. Investors' ltered probability of this regime peaked around the 1981
recession, and did not fully subside until the end of the following recession in 1983. Notably, the
belief of this regime increased to nearly 10 percent, before deation expectations set in the 2008
nancial crisis.
Regime s5: ( = 1:5%; = 7:7%; = 1%;! =  3:1%). This is the new economy regime. Earnings
growth is at its most rapid, ination and capacity utilization are low, but money has tightened
likely a reection of the central bank's efforts to moderate growth. Investors' probability of
this regime peaked at about 50% in the late 1990s, but crashed during the 2001 recession as
investors' hopes of the new economy tanked. There was a mild increase of this probability in the
boom period in the 2000s, which again tanked in the 2008 recession.
Regime s6: ( =  0:2%; =  5:7%; =  6:6%;! = 5:3%). This is the deation regime of the econ-
omy, in which earnings shrink at their most rapid rate in the cycle. CUis 6.6%below its historical
average, and money growth is very rapid as the central bank attempts to stimulate growth. In-
vestors' deation expectations have spiked in the recessions of the current millennium, but were
also high after the 1982 recession after the Fed's efforts to tame strong ination expectations.
Regime s7: ( = 6:5%; =  5:2%; =  6:6%;! =  3:1%). This is a deep recession regime, in which
ination and earnings growth are similar to those in the mild recession (regime 2), but CU is
very low and money shrinks, which likely results as monetary policy is no longer effective in
stimulating the economy. Investors' ltered probability of this regime was at its highest after the
oil price induced recession in 1973, but has also been as high as 30% in the current recession.
Combined with their high deation probability in this period, investors' ination uncertainty has
been very in this recession.
Regime s8: ( = 1:5%; = 6:1%; =  6:6%;! = 5:3%). We call this the low capacity boom regime of
the economy in which ination and earnings growth are as in the regular boom regime (regime
1), however, the growth seems shaky since CU is very low and money growth is very strong
likely as a result of very proactive stimulative efforts by the central bank. Investors' probability
of this regime hit close to 30 percent in the recovery periods following recessions in the early
1970s and mid 1980s, and was even higher in 2000s prior to the most recent recession. The high
20money growth in this period is consistent with the easy credit regime that is oft cited as the cause
of the increase in stock and house prices in this decade.
The uncertainty of investors is generated in large part by their estimations of transitions between
regimes, which we show in the top and middle panels of Table 2. In the top panels we see how ination
interacts with earnings stability. In the boom regimes with low ination (regimes 1,5 and 8), investors'
estimate only a 1.2 percent chance of a recession in the next year, while in regime 3, when earnings
are still booming, but ination heats up to a medium level, the transition to a recession regime in the
following quarter rises to about 8.5 percent. The role of low CU in affecting transitions can be seen by
comparing the annual transitions in the regular (regime 2) and deep (regime 7) recession regimes to the
deation regime. Indeed, the risk of entering deation rises from about 0.5 from the regular recession,
to about 7.7 percent from a deep recession, when CU is extremely weak, which explains the spike in
deation fears in the two recessions of the current millennium. The middle panel of the table, shows
the 5-year transitions between regimes, which show the medium-term risks to fundamentals. Notable
among these transitions, is the large persistence of the new-economy growth regime, which suggests
that even after ve years, investors expect to remain in that regime with a probability exceeding 92
percent. It is also relevant to point out that the estimated persistence of the deation regime is the
lowest among all regimes. This estimate likely arises from the fairly rapid recovery of industrial CU
from its troughs, which we have seen in our sample that began in 1967.
2.4 Estimation Results for the Taylor Rule and State Price Density
We next turn to the parameter estimates determining the pricing kernel. As shown in Table 1, the
interest rate rule parameters suggest that the real rate in the economy depends positively on both the
hidden regime of ination  = 0:362 and  = 0:257: We note that these estimates are similar to
estimates of the Taylor rule in many other papers and indeed Taylor's own work suggested values of
each parameter of 0.5. It is useful to remember that in our model we use industrial CU rather than the
output gap used by Taylor, and the rates depend on the expected drifts of the variables rather than the
variable realizations themselves.
The next line in Table 1 shows the prices of risk. Most notably, the prices or risk of the earnings
shock, the CU shock, and kernel shock itself are all positive and large (around 0.3), however, the
prices of risk of the ination and money growth shocks are small. The ination shock has a positive
21price of risk, while the money growth shock has a negative price of risk. As we see in our plot of the
fundamental series, money growth is strongly countercyclical, and investors estimate that their marginal
utility increases in periods with high money growth.
2.5 Model Fit to the Data
Using the time series of investors' regime probabilities in Figure 3 and the estimated parameters, we
generate time series ofmodel-implied expected fundamental growth and stock and Treasury bond prices
in Figure 4. We start by making a few comments about the trends in fundamentals. As noted by
several authors, ination has largely trended downwards since the early 1980s, even though it picked
up before the 1991 and 2008 recessions. Very notably, the CPI fell by nearly 2 percent in the recent
recession, fanning deation fears. Earnings is the most volatile of the fundamental series, and has
witnessed massive drops of 15 and 25 percent in the past two recessions, and has generally fallen by
smaller amounts in all past recessions in the sample. The other real fundamental, de-meaned industrial
CU, is also highly procyclical. It is smoother than the other series, and our model ts it very closely
throughout the sample, except perhaps at the end of the 1982 recession, when it fell far more than
predicted by the model. As is perhaps evident from comparing the rst and third panels, CU and
ination are positively correlated (correlation of nearly 35 percent). Indeed for much of the 1970s,
there was high CU accompanied by high ination. The demise of ination in the 1980s resulting
from high interest rates also choked off CU. More recently in the 2000s, deation fears resulting from
low or falling CPI also accompanied very low CU. The nal fundamental in the bottom panel, real
money growth shows some interesting comovements with the business cycle, which our model captures
correctly. In the 1970s, money growth was tightened during recessions, while in the recessions of the
2000s, money growth grew very rapidly. The different policy response in these recessions is likely
in part determined by the different trends in CU in these recessions noted above and highlights the
interdependence between the different fundamentals.
As noted, the model expected growth rate of the fundamentals seem to track the major trends in
realized fundamentals quite closely. The ts of the model are reported in Table 3. The model expected
growth rate explains 62, 16, 75, and 37 percent of the variation in the realized fundamental for ina-
tion, earnings growth, capacity utilization, and real money growth, respectively. We note that our SMM
procedure, which maximizes the likelihood of investors observing the historical fundamental processes,
22does not have an explicit prediction on the tted actual fundamentals in each period, but instead charac-
terizes expected fundamental growth. Therefore, these ts reect not simply the accuracy of our model,
but in addition, investors' estimates on the fraction of variation in fundamental growth that is related
to shifts in trend growth rates as opposed to purely idiosyncratic variation. So, e.g., earnings growth is
the most volatile fundamental, and the model explains the lowest amount of its variation, while CU is
the smoothest, and the model explains most of its variation. Also note that the regression coefcients
in the expectations regressions are between 1.3 and 2.2 so that actual fundamentals are more volatile
than their expectations.
The ability of the model to replicate the uctuations in stock and Treasury bond prices is displayed
in Figure 5 and the t statistics are reported in Table 3. The model explains most uctuations in the
S&P500 P/E ratio, in particular the single digit P/Es in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the return to
high teens levels in the 1980s, the rapid rise to over 25 in the late 1990s. and the decline in the 2000s
again, overall explaining about 60 percent of the historical variation. The middle and bottom panel
shows that the model is also quite successful in explaining most of the variation in the short rate and
the slope of the term structure of Treasuries. The use of a Taylor-type rule is mostly instrumental in
explaining the sharp dips in short rates following most of the recessions, although notably, the model
short rate recovered more rapidly than the historical series in the early 1990s and the 2000s. In addition,
the historical slope was higher in these two episodes than our model can explain. Overall, or model
explains more than 50 percent of the variation in the short rate and slope. It is worth noting that our
model does not rely on `unobservable' factors that are used in the exponential afne term structure
literature [see e.g. Dai and Singleton (2002)] to explain the uctuations in these variables, but only on
beliefs it which are tied down by the dynamics of fundamentals.
The nal components of our SMM error term are the moments based on option prices that we
discuss separately in Section 3. Using the scores of the likelihood function and the errors of the price
and volatility variables, we evaluate the SMM objective function, which serves as an omnibus test
statistic. The overall SMM objective function value, which has a chi-squared distribution with ve
degrees of freedom, is 10.47, implying a p-value larger than 5%, so we fail to reject our model.
233 Option Implied Fear Indices and Monetary Policy
This section contains our main results: Before discussing the relation between options and monetary
policy, we rst show that the model ts well the fear indices ATMIV and P/C, and elaborate on their
relation with several macro-economic control variables that have been used in the literature. We then
turn to the model implications for options and monetary variables.
3.1 Explaining Time-Variation in ATM Implied Volatility
To gauge the impact of fundamentals on ATMIV, the bottom panel of Table 2 computes the model's
implied ATMIV when investors are 80 percent sure of being in each of the eight regimes respectively.10
It is immediately evident from the table that the model implies that implied volatility is generally coun-
tercyclical, being higher in regimes with negative earnings growth (regimes 2,4, 6, and 7). Its highest
levels occur during stagation periods (regime 4) when investors' beliefs are the most reactive to in-
ation news. However, implied volatility can be high in strong regimes of the economy as well. In
particular in the new economy regime (regime 5), ATMIV is close to that in some recession regimes. In
this regime, strong economic growth raises investors' future earnings uncertainty causing high volatil-
ity. This observation is made in David and Veronesi (2009) for explaining the conditional positive
relation between P/E ratios and realized volatility in the late 1990s.
The historical and model-tted ATMIV series are shown in the top panel of Figure 1 and some
regressions examining the ts are in Table 4. Our historical time series spans a long period of nearly
23 years that covers the recessions of 1991, 2001, and 2008, as well unusual events such as the stock
market crash of 1987, the collapse of LTCM in 1998, and the bursting of the technology bubble in
2000. As seen in the gure, during each of these events implied volatility increased above 30 percent,
while its average over the sample is 18.5 percent. Our model implied volatility, which only builds in the
impact of macroeconomic uncertainty, follows closely the increase in data implied volatility during the
three recessions, and remains high in the post technology bubble period. Although the model is unable
10An important caveat to note is that the model ATMIV is not a linear function of beliefs but instead is more directly
associated with the uncertainty about the regimes. Therefore, the implications for intermediate beliefs should not be
approximated by interpolating the ATMIV at the regime beliefs in the table.
24to explain the surge in volatility during the 1987 crash or the LTCM episode, media commentary at or
around these episodes conrms that macro events were not the cause of these crises.11
It is also noteworthy that the model captures well the post-recession decline in implied volatility
from 1991 to 1996 and from 2001 to 2006 despite the fairly different macroeconomic conditions in
these recessions. While earnings growth rebounded after each recession, the 1991 recession had tight
CU and weak money growth, while the opposite conditions prevailed in the 2001 recession. In the
former recession, rising ination was a concern, while in the latter, investors were concerned about
deation. The unwinding of these conditions was therefore quite different in the two periods, but at
the end of these cathartic periods, investors beliefs of regime 1 (the regular boom) increased to over 60
percent (Figure 3) and implied volatility hit lows in the 10-13 percent range. The model is also quite
successful in explaining the spike in implied volatility in the current recession, which started with the
fear of an increase in ination to a medium level and an increase investors' probability of the economy
overheating (regime 3) and deep recession (regime 7), followed by the collapse of ination and increase
in the fear of deation in the second half of 2008. The model ATMIV hit about 50 percent at the end
of 2008, its highest level in the 23 year sample, although it was lower than the nearly 70 percent in the
data.12
Table 4 contains formal statistics of the t of our model for the data ATMIV series. Line 1 shows
that the  R2 of the simple regression of the data ATMIV on the model ATMIV for the full sample is 53
percent, and the beta coefcient is 0.91, which is very close to 1. Excluding the fourth quarter of 1987
from the regression increases the  R2 by another 5 percentage points (not reported). As well known in
the GARCH literature, most measures of volatility are persistent. Line 2 shows that the regression  R2
of 32 percent of the data ATMIV series on its own lag. In line 3, we include both the model and the
lag, and nd an  R2 of 58 percent, or an increase of about 5 percentage points over our model.
We next provide regression results for the ve macroeconomic variables that we found signicant
individually in lines 4 through 8. These results show that ATMIV is a procyclical variable but none of
them is able to explain much of the variation of ATMIV. Indeed, line 9 shows that together all these
11Microstructure issues have been attributed to each of these two crises. Trading problems arose due to the breakdown in
market mechanisms by the large trades of portfolio insurers in 1987, while the shutdown of several markets simultane-
ously led to the severe liquidity problems in 1998.
12Undoubtedly, the selling pressure from the collapse of Lehman Brothers and troubles at other nancial institutions world-
wide had an impact of volatility in this period more than can be accounted for by our model. However, these failures
were endogenous, and our model does suggest that there were greater fundamental stresses in this period than any other
period in our sample.
25controls explain 36 percent of the variation in the ATMIV, signicantly below that of our model. How-
ever, our model suggests, that while these variables are important determinants of implied volatility,
they affect it jointly and in a nonlinear way, which our model captures through the combination of the
expected discounted value of cash ows in our asset pricing formulae and the use of Bayes'rule. In
addition, some variables, like ination and money growth, are not signicant in a linear regression,
but their effect is embedded in our model ATMIV, through the joint regime specication with real
fundamentals.
We nally consider the effects of combining the lags and the controls with our model ATMIV (line
10) and add the lagged data ATMIV (line 11). The  R2 increase to 61% and 66% in the two cases,
respectively. The 8% increase in explanatory power in line 10 over line 1 (model only) is likely the
result of the highly parsimonious nature of our model, which nonetheless does explain most of the
variation in the joint specication. The further 5 percentage point increase over line 10 in line 11 tells
us that there are persistent economic forces that explain incremental amounts of variation in ATMIV,
which are not in our model or controls. The information in the lag likely includes trading disruptions,
which as mentioned above were particularly important at the time of the stock market crash and the
LTCM failure. It remains a challenge to include such information into a model that already builds in
the macroeconomic effects as in our model specication, which as noted explain about 80% of the
predictable variation.
3.2 Explaining Time-Variation in the Put-Call Ratio
In this section westudy the model's ability to explain the put-call ratio (P/C),which wedened to be the
ratio of implied volatilities of 5 percent out-of-the money put and call options.13 To understand what
forces affect the P/C ratio, it is useful to rst look at Figure 6 that shows the densities of stock returns
when investors are 80 percent certain of being in each of the eight regimes (the remaining regimes each
have equal probability). The top (bottom) panel shows the densities for the boom (recession) regimes,
which are regimes with expected positive (negative) earnings growth. As seen, the densities are nega-
tively (positively) skewed for the boom (recession) regimes. These shapes naturally imply that the P/C




26is greater (smaller) than one for the boom (recession) regimes.14 The conditional values of the put call
ratio and higher moments of the stock return distribution under the risk-neutral measure are given in
the bottom panel of Table 2. The table also shows that the densities at these eight beliefs are all highly
non-Gaussian with skewness coefcients of between -3.3 and 1.4, and kurtosis coefcient of between
4.3 and 21.5. The non-Gaussianity partly stems from the jumps in returns due to jumps in earnings,
and partly from the continuous shifting of the instantaneous moments of the return distribution. Indeed,
we note that the jump intensity in earnings is constant, so all the time variation in the densities arises
from the shifting moments. Its is also interesting to note that the sign of the skewness in each of the
regimes can be calculated quite easily by looking at the sign of covariance between stock returns and
stock variance in each regime from its closed-form expression in (23). As seen in Table 2, the sign
of the conditional correlation mostly matches the sign of conditional skewness in each regime. The
intuition for the sign is as follows: By Bayes' Law, in the boom regimes, investors revise their be-
liefs more rapidly when they receive negative shocks to earnings than positive shocks, leading to more
volatility with negative outcomes, which is a negative correlation between returns and variance. The
higher volatility in down regimes give a negative sloped implied volatility curve or a positive put call
ratio The opposite holds true for the low earnings growth rate regimes.
The bottom panel of Figure 1 shows the data and model P/Cs. As can be seen, both series are almost
always greater than one (each is less than one only once in the sample) and the model P/C tracks the
data P/C quite closely. Somewhat surprisingly, the gure shows that the P/C is procyclical, falling in
each NBER-dated recession. Comparing to the top panel, gives the surprising stylized fact that the
ATMIV and the P/C are negatively related. In particular, in 1995 when the ATMIV hovered around
lows of near 10 percent, the P/C hovered above 1.6. Similarly, around 2006, when the ATMIV was
again around 10 percent, the P/C ratio was again above 1.4. In and after the three recessions in the
sample, when the ATMIV rose above 30 percent, the P/C fell below 1.2. We return to the issue of
negative correlation between the two fear indices below.
Line 1 of Table 5 provides the simple regressions of the data P/C on the model P/C. As seen, the t
is very solid with a statistically insignicant alpha coefcient, a beta of 0.72 (not different statistically
14Notice from the ltered probabilities, that investors were never 80 percent certain of any of the regimes in our sample, so
that the model P/Cs were never as extreme as reported for these regimes. In particular the model P/C was almost always
positive in our sample. It is also important to note, that the P/C is not linear in the beliefs, and values for intermediate
beliefs will not be well approximated by interpolation. In particular we nd that that the P/C at intermediate regimes is
outside of the range in Table 2.
27from 1) and  R2 of 45.4 percent. Line 2 reports that the lagged P/Cexplains a similar  R2 of 45.8 percent,
but of course does not provide us intuition on the underlying economic forces driving the P/C. When
both model and lag are included, each of the variables is statistically signicant, and the explanatory
power increases by 8 percentage points, implying that the lag has some information over and above that
of our model.
Line 4 to 8 provide regression results for the ve the ve macroeconomic variables that we found
signicant for the ATMIV, and are inputs to our model. In addition, we also report in Line 9 and 10
results for two market sentiment measures advanced by Han (2008): The rst, atrader sentiment,
is the net long position of large speculators on S&P 500 index futures obtained from the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission's Commitment of Traders Report. The second, an investor sentiment
is the bull-bear spread (proportion of traders bullish less bearish) in Investor's Intelligence's survey of
investment newsletter writers.15
Line 10 include all the macroeconomic controls and the sentiment variables in a joint regression in
line 11, and nd an adjusted R2 of only about 21.9 percent, far below our model. This reinforces the
view that the macroeconomic variables affect the P/C nonlinearly. Finally, using all the variables along
with the model and lagged P/C, leads to a very small increase in explanatory power over using just the
model and lag.
3.3 Monetary Policy and Market Fears Measures
As noted in the introduction, and shown in the left panels of Figure 2, shocks to fear measures lead to
a sustained impact on future monetary policy, while monetary policy measures do not impact on the
fear measures. More specically, a shock to ATMIV leads to a decrease in future interest rates while a
shock to the P/C leads to an increase in future interest rates. Is the model able to replicate such results?
The right panels of Figure 2 show the analogous impulse responses when the same vector autore-
gression is computed on the model tted fear measures and policy variables. Comparing to the panels
on the left, we nd that our tted model has exactly the same relationships as in the data: Fear mea-
sures lead to sustained effects for up to eight quarters on policy variables, while the reverse impulses
15Both variables are measured within a week prior to the options trades. These measures are alternative measures of fear
in the market and are thus compelling control variables for our measures of downside risk obtained from asset prices. While
Han (2008) suggests that the signicance of these measures supports a behavioral view of asset prices, we note that they could
be consistent with a rational model of heterogeneous learning about the regimes of fundamentals such as in David (2008a).
28are statistically insignicant. Having a fully dynamic model that can replicate the historical impulses is
useful since it can rule out certain channels for the effects. In particular, in our model the central bank
and investors have exactly the same information. So, the reason why policy follows market fears is not
due to differences in information of the two groups of agents.
What economic channel then explains the one-directional impulses? The bottom panels of Figure
2 suggest that market fears have a sustained effect on industrial CU. In particular, in our model an
increase in ATMIV occurs because of increases in the uncertainty about the current economic regime.
The impact of higher uncertainty on future industrial CU then easily follows from the real options
literature, whereby rmsdelay the abandonment ofplants and factories inthe face of higher uncertainty,
instead choosing to operate them at less than full capacity [see e.g. Bloom (2009)]. Because the central
bank has the same information as the investors, the learning-based Taylor rule then implies that shocks
to uncertainty (ATMIV) have a sustained future impact on interest rates.
Our model also uncovers another basic economic mechanism that explains why a shock to the
downside fear measure P/C is correlated with a future increase in CU. The reason is that in our model,
a positive shock to P/C occurs when investors increase their beliefs to be an expansionary phase of the
economy (see Figure 6). Because of symmetric information, such beliefs also affect the central bank's
learning-based Taylor rule. Thus, the increase in P/C is correlated with an increase in expected future
CU, which then leads to a tightening of monetary policy through higher interest rates.
In Figure 2 we only report impulse responses from fear measures to interest rates and capacity
utilization. What about the relation between fear measures and money growth? We did compute the
impulse responses for the effects of fears on money growth and did not nd signicant responses in
either direction. This (negative) result is interesting as well. The next subsection further develops the
relation between fear measures and monetary policy variables, and explains these ndings.
Before concluding this section we add two caveats to these results. First, the impulse response func-
tions are estimated for the options subsample, when the relationship between CU and the fear measures
happen to be monotonic. As we show next in Section 3.4, over the full sample, the relationship is
nonlinear and impulse responses may well have the opposite signs for the rst part of our sample, when
tight CU lead to monetary policy tightening. Second, the impulses studied here are at a quarterly fre-
quency, and we do not rule out that the central bank can have signicant impulses at shorter horizons
in higher frequency data.
293.4 Nonlinear Relations Between Fear Indices and Macro-Policy Variables
The results in Section 3.3 calls for further investigation of the relation between option prices and pol-
icy variables. In this subsection, we document strong nonlinear relationships between macro-policy
variables and option prices. In addition, we show that the money growth affect the fear indices more
noticeably in periods that the policy makers stimulate the economy.
The top panels of Figure 7 show the relationship between the fear measures and expected real money
growth. The x-axis in these plots has the expected money growth of investors which we have shown
in Figure 4.16 As can be seen, the ATMIV has an V-shape, with its minimum at close to one percent
real money growth. The tted curve shows a higher ATMIV when money growth is tight (around 26
percent) as opposed to when its accommodative (around 21 percent), and dips to around 17, when
money growth is neutral. By comparing the estimated fear variable values in the different regimes in
Table 2 we can see how our model generates the V-shape. Consider regimes 2 and 4 for example, which
have the highest ATMIV. Real money growth is strongly positive in the former regime, and is strongly
negative in regime 4. In regime 2, money growth is rapid as the central bank attempts to stimulate the
economy in the regular recession, and the conditional relationship between money growth and ATMIV
is negative. In regime 4, volatility is high even as the central bank attempts to rein in high ination even
though real growth is weak and the conditional relationship is positive. Similarly, in the new economy
growth rate regime, the ATMIV is high as discussed, and money growth is tight, as the central bank
attempts to rein in lofty expectations of real growth. On the low end, in the stable regime 1 with low
ination and high real growth, real money growth is one percent and the ATMIV is the lowest.
The bottom panels of Figure 7 show the relationship between the fear measures calculated from
our model using the ltered beliefs in Figure 3 and realized CU (which is a fairly smooth series). As
seen, the ATMIV again has a V-shape relationship, while the P/C has an inverse V-shape. We plot the
relationship for the full sample for our model since de-meaned CU never rose above 3 percent in the
1986-2008 period, when we have options data. In this period, the relationship between the data ATMIV
and CU is negative, while that with the P/C is positive. In the period of the options data, higher CU was
taken as good news for fundamentals, which lowered uncertainty and the ATMIV and raised the P/C.
For the full sample, which includes periods with very high CU, the relationships are non-monotonic
16We plot this relationship rather than the one between the ATMIV and realized money growth, since the latter is fairly
noisy and provides a less precise relationship with a similar shape.
30as described above, since during periods of high CU, an increase in CU increased uncertainty about
future fundamentals and had the opposite effects on the fear variables. The implied fear measures in
the alternative regimes in Table 2 also show this relationship, as high ATMIV can result in recessions
with high CU (regime 3) or low CU (regime 7). Once again, fundamentals' uncertainty is negatively
related to P/C so that it has an inverse V-shape relation with CU (bottom right panel of Figure 7).
We end this discussion on the nonlinear relation between macro-nance variables and fear measures
by studying their conditional relation during stimulative periods. We dene stimulative periods as those
where the 3-month Treasury Bill Yield is below the annualized ination (CPI) rate. In the sub-sample
of our date where we have options data (1986:2  2008) there are 20 quarters that we characterize
as stimulative. These are periods of extreme stress in the market and it is of interest to study the
response of the stock markets to money growth in these times. The left panel of Figure 8 shows
that in this period ATMIV and money growth were negatively correlated. In the right panel we plot
our model ATMIV and expected money growth and nd a negative correlation which is somewhat
stronger. The negative relation tell us that the actions of the central bank to boost money growth in
such periods lowered the uncertainty and volatility in stock market, and our regime-switching model
captures well this conditional relation. This role of monetary policy in reducing market uncertainty in
stressful times is obviously not evident in simple linear regressions and could be the responsible for
the general disillusionment with monetary aggregates in the literature (see e.g. Volcker (1977)). Our
results also provide direct evidence from the options markets on the effectiveness of monetary policy
during stimulative periods.
4 Additional Properties of Option Prices
In this section we discuss features of observed option prices that are not directly tted by our empirical
methodology. The ability of our model to replicate these additional features provides further support for
the economic mechanism that determines option prices in our model. As we will see the key variable
in the model that enables it to explain these additional facts is the volatility of stock volatility, and we
will end the section by providing its determinants.
314.1 The Volatility of ATM Volatility
In the previous section we saw that our model ATMIV was able to explain about 53 percent of the
variation in the data ATMIV. In the model, the implied volatility is to a large part determined by the
endogenous volatility of stock prices, which increases during periods of greater investor and central
bank uncertainty. In addition, looking again at the top panel of Figure 1, we see that during episodes
of high volatility around the three NBER dated recessions in the options subsample, ATMIV also
uctuated by large amounts. The positive relation between volatility and the volatility of volatility is
noted in Jones (2003) who further notes that it cannot arise in the Heston (1993) stochastic volatility
model, which has been the workhorse of the option pricing literature. To obtain the level dependence of
volatility, Jones (2003) proposes a generalization of the Constant Elasticity of Variance (CEV) model
of Chan, Karolyi, Longstaff, and Sanders (1992). One drawback of the volatility processes in such
models as is that they do not satisfy global growth and Lipschitz conditions, which are commonly used
sufcient statistics for a number of important results. In this subsection we investigate if our model
is able to shed light on the positive association between volatility and changes in volatility. Indeed as
can be seen in (10), the Bayesian learning mechanism that drives volatility in our model implies that
investors revise their beliefs faster during periods of high uncertainty as they have low condence in
their estimates of the current regime of the fundamentals. We already established in Proposition 4 that
our model stock price satises the regularity conditions.
The top panels of Figure 9 show the scatter plots of implied volatility and absolute changes in im-
plied volatility for the data and model series. Both show a positive association of similar magnitude
between these variables with correlations of 41 percent and 49 percent, respectively, and these correla-
tions are statistically signicant. We next check if the absolute changes in implied volatility are related
to the volatility of stock volatility in our model. To do this we construct a time series of the model's
volatility of volatility using (22) and evaluate it at each date using the ltered beliefs in Figure 3. The
scatter plot of absolute changes in implied volatility (data and model) with this series are shown in
the bottom panels. As seen, the model volatility of volatility is highly correlated with both the data
and model absolute changes in implied volatility with correlations of 34 and 61 percent respectively.
Note that the model series measures the ex-ante volatility of volatility at each date and is compared to
the ex-post realized absolute changes in ATMIV and our model predicts a positive but not one-to-one
32association between these variables. This is highlighted by the fact that the correlation between these
variables is only about 61 percent correlation even when both variables are generated by our model.
4.2 The Implied Volatility Premium
The volatility premium is an ex-ante measure of the stock market volatility forecast of investors' priced
into options relative to a volatility forecast under the objective (P) measure, and is currently one of the
most actively researched statistics in empirical option pricing. If volatility is systematically positively
related to investors' pricing kernel (marginal utility of consumption), then as a priced factor it carries
a negative risk premium, which leads to a higher forecast of volatility under the Q measure, or a
positive volatility premium. The strong evidence that volatility is countercyclical, which we have
already discussed in Section 3, suggests that the volatility premium should be positive.
The empirical nance literature now has more than one operational denition of this quantity. The
rst, which we call the implied volatility premium (IVP) is dened as the difference between at-the-
money implied volatility and a forecast of future volatility to the maturity of the option under the
objective (P) measure. The forecast under the P measure is constructed for specic volatility models.
It must be noted that the implied volatility is a measure ofthe overall value of the option, which includes
jumps as well as other non-Gaussian aspects of the stock return distribution, and these components also
impact the IVP. A second denition, which we call the forecast volatility risk premium (FVRP), simply
takes the difference in forecasts of future volatility under the two measures. The two different forecasts
are formed with the same structural model and differ only by the difference in volatility drift, which is
determined by the specication of the pricing kernel process.17
In this subsection we evaluate the ability of our model to shed light on the time variation of the
IVP process. Thus our focus is different from the early papers on this topic that were focused around
forecasting volatility using implied volatility and the implied volatility premium. Notable among these
papers are Canina and Figlewski (1993) and Christensen and Prabhala (1998) who nd that implied
volatility is a useful albeit biased forecaster of future realized volatility. More recent work cited in the
introduction has provided equilibrium models to understand the size of the equity premium, but not its
time variation, which is our focus in this paper.
17In addition, Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou (2009) use a measure of an ex-post volatility premium that takes the difference
between implied volatility and realized volatility to predict future stock returns.
33To construct a data based ex-ante IVP series we need forecasts of realized volatility, which we
discuss rst. We construct two forecasts using well established results in the volatility forecasting
literature, which wediscussed in Section 3.1. The specications weuse are similar to those in Drechsler
and Yaron (2010). The rst specication for our sample from 1986:Q2 to 2008:Q4 is a regression of
realized volatility on its one-quarter lag, the lagged P/E ratio, and lagged returns on the S&P 500 index
in periods when they are negative, which we call Projection 1. The results of this regression are:
Vol(t + 1) = 3:291 + 0:548Vol(t) + 0:212P/E(t)   0:470Ret (t);  R2 = 0:238 (26)
[1:170] [2:122] [1:237] [ 2:004]
where Vol(t+1) is the volatility realized in quarter t+1, which we dene as the square root of the sum
of squared S&P 500 index returns in the quarter, P=E(t) is the S&P 500 price-to-operating earnings
ratio, and Ret (t) is the return on the S&P 500 index in periods when it is negative. T-Statistics are
in parenthesis and are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using the Newey and West
(1987) method. The regression  R2 improves to 47 percent for the post-crash subsample starting in
1988:Q2.18 The second forecast is similar to that constructed in Drechsler and Yaron (2010), which
used the lagged implied volatility to forecast realized volatility and adjusts for the forecast bias, which
we call Projection 2. The results of this regression are:
Vol(t + 1) = 2:334 + 0:019Vol(t) + 0:709I. Vol(t);  R2 = 0:393 (27)
[1:659] [0:165] [4:986]
The  R2 of this regression improves to over 63 percent if the stock market crash is excluded. It is
important to note that for each projection we use non-overlapping data by constructing one-quarter
ahead volatility forecasts at the quarterly frequency so that the t-statistics are more reliable.
Using the difference between the implied volatility at the beginning of the quarter t and the expec-
tation of quarter t realized volatility based on data available at the end of quarter t   1; we form the
ex-ante volatility premium series. Using the two alternative forecasts of realized volatility, we have two
measures of the ex-ante volatility premium, which we display in the top and middle panels of Figure
18Most papers on volatility premium studies exclude the stock market crash from their samples. We nd that the ability of
our model in explaining the time variation in the volatility premium is not sensitive to the exclusion of the crash.
3410. The two series have a correlation of 88 percent, and their means are very similar at 2.7 and 2.9
percent respectively. We similarly construct a model based IVP series by taking the difference between
the model implied volatility analyzed in Section 3.1 and the model forecast of volatility under the P-
measure using simulation methods as described in equation (50) in Appendix 2. The model IVP,IVPM,
is also displayed in these panels. The mean of the IVPM is 4.4 percent, which is higher than the data
premium means. However, it is important to note that we did not use the data IVP in our estimation
procedure to match the same sample average as in the data. It is also relevant to note that our main goal
is to understand the time-variation in the volatility premium, which we discuss next.
By regressing the volatility premium from projections 1 and 2, we get the following ts:
IVP1(t) =  1:258 + 0:634IVPM(t);  R2 = 0:168: (28)
[ 0:910] [2:293]
IVP2(t) = 0:014 + 0:539IVPM(t);  R2 = 0:122: (29)
[0:015] [2:673]
As can be seen, the intercept terms are small and statistically insignicant, and the betas of the regres-
sion are instead strongly signicant, and the model explains nearly 17 percent of the variation in the
data IVP from Projection 1, which is economically signicant. As seen in the plot, both data and model
volatility premiums are countercyclical, are higher higher in periods of higher volatility. Once again,
our model is not able to t the uctuation in the volatility premium in during the stock market crash
or the collapse of LTCM, which were events not likely related to macroeconomic fundamentals. The
model does capture the higher premiums during the recessions in the sample, and the decline in pre-
mium in good times. The t for the IVP from Projection 2 is similar, although the explanatory power
is lower and 12 percent. Looking at the middle panel, the qualitative feature of the model t is very
similar though.
We next examine if the IVP of our model is related to its FVRP. The two series are plotted in the
third panel of Figure 10. The Q forecast of our model is constructed using the same methodology as the
P forecast and is shown in (49) in Appendix 2. The FVRP is simply the difference in the two forecasts.
Constructing the series conditional on beliefs for our full sample we nd an average FVRP of 1.75
percent. As suggested at the beginning of this subsection, the IVP has two components, the FVRP, and
35the non-Gaussian components of the density. Our estimated time series of the two premiums suggest
that the FVRP comprises about 40 percent of the total IVP. The gure also shows that the two series
are highly correlated (correlation coefcient of 93.8 percent).
What explains the model's IVP? To understand the driving determinants, we investigate further
some model generated time series. A natural candidate to consider is the volatility of volatility (VV).
IVPM(t) = 5:216 + 1:663 log(VVM)(t);  R2 = 0:401: (30)
[11:194] [4:208]
In Figure 9 we showed that volatility uctuations are higher in periods when the VVis higher. Equation
(30) tells us that the options are priced more dearly when there is greater volatility in stock volatility,
suggesting that volatility is itself a priced risk factor. We study this further by regressing the two
components of the volatility premium on the VV:
FVRPM(t) = 0:761 + 1:289 log(VVM)(t);  R2 = 0:530: (31)
[3:145] [5:243]
IVPM(t)   FVRPM(t) = 4:462 + 0:387 log(VVM)(t);  R2 = 0:103: (32)
[16:084] [1:991]
Equation (31) tells us that a large part of the uctuation in the model IVP from the VV is captured by
the uctuation in the FVRP portion of the IVP. In fact the explanatory power of the VV for the FVRP
is well over 50 percent. In contrast, the explanatory power for the the residual portion, IVP-FVRP, on
the VV is only 11 percent. Therefore, only a small part of the residual premium, which essentially
captures the non-Gaussian aspect of the return distribution under the risk-neutral measure is related to
the VV, which directly impacts the fourth moment of returns. Finally, we note that returns in our model
are non-normal also because of the jumps in the earnings and kernel processes. However, the jump
parameters are all constant, so that any time-variation in higher moments in the model arises from the
variation in beliefs about macroeconomic regimes, which affects the VV and as well as other higher
order moments.
364.3 What Drives the Volatility of Stock Volatility?
As seen above, VV explains the positive comovement of ATMIV and its absolute changes as well as
the dynamics of the implied volatility premium. The VV is endogenously generated by the learning
process in our model and is a result of the the nonlinear updating inherent in Bayes' law. In periods
where investors are more uncertain about fundamentals, they put less weight on their current beliefs
and more weight on incoming news so that revisions to beliefs and hence stock market volatility are
higher. This implies that the VV should be directly related to measures of investors' uncertainty.












We plot the time series of VV and the four fundamental uncertainties in Figure 11, and Table 6 provides
results on the simple OLS regressions of the VV on these variables for options subsample (1986:Q2
 2008). While all four uncertainties are strongly countercyclical, we nd that earnings uncertainty
has been the single most important driver of the VV explaining more than 70 percent of its variation.
Money growth uncertainty also explains a signicant amount of variation in the VV, while the other
two uncertainties have been of minor importance. As noted in Section 3.4, CU itself has an impact on
the fear indices, but as seen here, uncertainty about CU is not a signicant driver of VV. This result
arises because CUis a fairly smooth process so that uncertainty about it does not drive major changes in
investors uncertainty. Money growth uncertainty turns out to be an important driver as investors likely
perceive changes in money as an important signal of the view of the central bank about the regime of
the economy.
Taken together the four fundamental uncertainties explain more than 80 percent of the variation in
VV. Relatedly, Beber and Brandt (2008) show that volatility in stock and bond markets declines faster
following periods of high macroeconomic uncertainty extracted from the economic derivative markets
over a shorter sample from 2002-2005.
375 Conclusion
Option prices provide key forward looking information on investors' expectations, and market attention
is often focused on two key fear indices, the ATMIV and the P/C. The former is measure of market tur-
bulence, while the latter is a measure of downside risk. Standard option pricing models use exogenous
stock prices and their volatilities that are unrelated to fundamentals, and are hence unable to identify
specic economic factors that can explain these fears. We provide a model in which stock, bond, and
option prices, are functions of investors' beliefs of the joint states of macroeconomic and policy fun-
damentals. The model is able to shed light on the counter (pro) cyclicality of the ATMIV (P/C), is able
to explain about half their time series variation, and their compelling nonlinear relations with policy
variables. In particular, the ATMIV (P/C) has a (inverse) V-shape with expected money growth and
capacity utilization. The model's ability to explain the time-series properties of these fear indices is
based on its inherent Bayesian learning framework in which volatility is high during periods of greater
uncertainty, and bad news leads to sharper downward revisions of beliefs in good times.
Our analysis also shows that investors' uncertainty in the options market has real economic conse-
quences, which is tempered by the efforts of the central bank to smooth uctuations. In particular, the
fear measures are able to predict future movements in interest rates. The model also explains that the
relationship between the fear indices and money growth is specially strong in periods of extreme stress
when the central bank follows a stimulative policy by keeping the short rate below the ination rate.
While investors' uncertainty is explicitly extracted from the fear indices, the dynamic updating of
investors' beliefs have implications for the volatility of stock market variance and additional properties
of options prices. In particular, we show our model is able to explain the positive correlation between
ATMIV and absolute changes in ATMIV (a feature that is not consistent with standard option pricing
models) and additionally is able to explain an economically signicant amount of variation in the
implied volatility premium. The model's implied volatility premium is driven to a large extent by the
risk premium for volatility shocks and to a lesser extent by the fatness of tails created by the continuous
shifting of moments of the return distribution from the Bayesian updating.
An important caveat is that the model, which structurally estimates the impact of investors uncer-
tainty about the macroeconomy on the fear indices, is unable to explain some important surges in these
indices at times when microstructure liquidity issues have roiled markets, such as the crash of 1987
and the collapse of LTCM in 1998. It is relevant to note that our empirical methodology, which uses
38information in fundamentals as well as prices, does not provide false alarms about macroeconomic
problems in these episodes that were clearly not macro related. Still, it remains a challenge to include
microstructure information into a model that already builds in the macroeconomic effects as in our
model specication.
References
Ang, A., and M. Piazzesi, 2003, A No-Arbitrage Vector Autoregression of Term Structure Dynamics with
Macroeconomic and Latent Variables, Journal of Monetary Economics, 50, 745787.
Ang, A., M. Piazzesi, and M. Wei, 2006, What Does the Yield Curve Tell Us About GDP Growth?, Journal of
Econometrics, 131, 359403.
Baekert, G., and E. Engstrom, 2010, Asset Return Dynamics under Bad Environment-Good Environment Fun-
damentals, Journal of Empirical Finance (Forthcoming).
Bakshi, G., C. Cao, and Z. Chen, 1997, Empirical Performance of Alternative Option Pricing Models, Journal
of Finance, 52, 20032051.
Bakshi, G., and N. Kapadia, 2003, Delta Hedged Gains and the Negative Volatility Risk Premium, Review of
Financial Studies, 16, 527566.
Bansal, R., and H. Zhou, 2002, Term Structure of Interest Rates with Regime Shifts, Journal of Finance, 57,
19972044.
Bates, D. S., 1991, The Crash of '87: Was it Expected? The Evidence from Options Markets, Journal of
Finance, 46, 10091044.
Bates, D. S., 1996,Jumps and Stochastic Volatility: ExchangeRate Processes Implicit in PHLX Deutsche Mark
Options, Review of Financial Studies, 9, 69107.




Beck, G., and V. Wieland, 2008, Central Bank Misperceptions and the Role of Money in Interest Rate Rules,
Journal of Monetary Economics, 55, 3568.
Bekaert, G., S. Cho, and A. Moreno, 2010, New Keynesian Macroeconomics and the Term Structure, Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking, 42, 3362.
Bekaert, G., M. Hoerova, and M. L. Duca, 2010, Risk, Uncertainty and Monetary Policy, Working Paper,
Columbia University.
Benzoni, L., P. Collin-Dufresne, and R. S. Goldstein, 2005, Can Standard Preferences Explian the Prices of
Out-of-the-MoneyS&P 500 Put Options, Working Paper, University of Minnesota.
Bernanke, B., and K. Kuttner, 2005, What Explains the Stock Markets Reaction to Federal Reserve Policy?,
Journal of Finance, 60, 12211257.
Bloom, N., 2009, The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks, Econometrica, 77, 623689.
Bollen, N. P. B., and R. E. Whaley, 2004, Does Net Buying Pressure Affect the Shape of Implied Volatility
Functions, Journal of Finance, 59, 711753.
39Bollerslev, T., G. Tauchen, and H. Zhou, 2009, Expected Stock Returns and Variance Risk Premia, Review of
Financial Studies, 22, 44634492.
Brandt, M. W., and P. Santa-Clara, 2002, Simulated Likelihood Estimation of Diffusions with an Application to
Exchange Rate Dynamics in Incomplete Markets, Journal of Financial Economics, 63, 161210.
Breeden, D. T., and R. H. Litzenberger, 1978, Prices of State-Contingent Claims Implicit in Options Prices,
Journal of Business, 51, 621651.
Buraschi, A., and J. Jackweerth, 2001,The Price of a Smile: HedgingandSpanningin OptionMarkets, Review
of Financial Studies, 14, 495527.
Buraschi, A., and A. Jiltsov, 2006, Model Uncertainty and Options Markets with Heterogeneous Beliefs, Jour-
nal of Finance, 61, 28412898.
Campbell, J. Y., A. W. Lo, and A. C. MacKinlay, 1997, The Econometrics of Financial Markets, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Canina,L.,andS.Figlewski,1993,TheInformationalContentofImpliedVolatility,ReviewofFinacialStudies,
6, 659681.
Chan, K., G. Karolyi, F. Longstaff, and A. B. Sanders, 1992, An Empirical Comparison of Alternative Models
of the Short-Term Interest Rate, Journal of Finance, 47, 12091227.
Christensen, B., and N. Prabhala, 1998, The Relation Between Implied and Realized Volatility, Journal of
Financial Economics, 50, 125150.
Christoffersen, P. F., K. Jacobs, C. Ornthanalai, and Y. Wang, 2008, Option Valuation with Long-runand Short-
run Volatility Components, Journal of Financial Economics, 90, 272297.
Clarida, R., J. Gali, and M. Gertler, 2000, Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and
Some Theory, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 140, 147180.
Cochrane, J. H., 2001, Asset Pricing, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Coenen, G., A. T. Levin, and V. Wieland, 2005, Data Uncertainty and the Role of Money as an Information
Variable in Monetary Policy, European Economic Review, pp. 9751006.
Constantinides, G., J. C. Jackwerth, and S. Perrakis, 2008, Mispricing of S&P 500 Index Options, Review of
Financial Studies (Forthcoming).
Dai, Q., and K. Singleton, 2002, Expectations Puzzles, Time-Varying Risk Premium, and Dynamic Models of
the Term Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 63, 415441.
David, A., 1997, Fluctuating Condence in Stock Markets: Implications for Returns and Volatility, Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 32, 427462.
David, A., 2008a, Heterogeneous Beliefs, Speculation, and the Equity Premium, Journal of Finance, 63, 41
83.
David, A., 2008b, Ination Uncertainty, Asset Valuations, and the Credit Spreads Puzzle, Review of Financial
Studies, 21, 24872534.
David, A., and P. Veronesi, 2009, What Ties Return Volatilities to Price Valuations and Fundamentals?, Work-
ing paper, University of Calgary and University of Chicago.
Drechsler, I., 2008, Uncertainty, Time-Varying Fear, and Asset Prices, Job market paper, Wharton School of
the University of Pennsylvania.
Drechsler, I., and A. Yaron, 2010, What's Vol Got to Do With It, Review of Financial Studies (Forthcoming).
40Du, D., 2010,GeneralEquilibriumPricingofoptionswithhabitformationandeventrisks, JournalofFinancial
Economics (Forthcoming).
Dubinsky, A., and M. Johannes, 2006, Earnings Announcements and Option Prices, Working Paper, Columbia
Univeristy.
Eraker, B., 2008, The Volatility Premium, Working Paper, University of Wisconsin Madison.
Eraker, B., M. Johannes, and N. Polson, 2003, The Impact of Jumps in Equity Index Volatility and Returns,
Journal of Finance, 58, 12691300.
Estrella, A., and F. S. Mishkin, 1998, Predicting U.S. Recessions: Financial Variables as Leading Indicators,
Review of Economics and Statistics, 1, 131.
Gallmeyer, M., B. Hollield, and S. Zin, 2005, Taylor rules, McCallum rules, and the term structure of interest
rates, Journal of Monetary Economics.
Garcia, R., 1998, Asymptotic Null Distribution of the Likelihood Ratio Test in Markov Switching Models,
International Economic Review, 39, 763788.
Garleanu,N., L. H. Pederson,and A. M. Poteshman, 2008,DemandBased OptionPricing, Review of Financial
Studies (Forthcoming).
Gray,S., 1996,ModelingtheConditionalDistributionofInterestRatesas aRegimeSwitchingProcess, Journal
of Financial Economics, 42, 2762.
Guidolin, M., and A. Timmermann, 2000, Option Prices and Implied Volatility Dynamics under Bayesian
Learning, Working paper, University of California, San Diego.
Hamilton, J. D., 1994, Time Series Analysis, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
Han, B., 2008, Investor Sentiment and Option Prices, Review of Financial Studies, 21, 387414.
Hansen, L. P., 2007, Beliefs, Doubts and Learning: Valuing Macroeconomic Risk, The American Economic
Review, Richard T. Ely Lecture, 97, 130.
Heston, S. L., 1993, A Closed-Form Solution for Options with Stochastic Volatility and Applications to Bond
and Currency Options, Review of Financial Studies, 6, 326343.
Hull, J.C., andA.White, 1987,ThePricingofOptionsonAssets withStochasticVolatility,JournalofFinance,
42, 281300.
Jones, C. S., 2003, The Dynamics of Stochastic Volatility: Evidence From Underlying and Options Markets,
Journal of Econometrics, 116, 181224.
Kloeden, P. E., and E. Platen, 1992, Numeric Solutions of Stochastic Differential Equations, Springer-Verlag,
New York.
Liu, J., J. Pan, and T. Wang, 2005, An Equilibrium Model of Rare Event Premia and its Implications for Option
Smirks, Review of Financial Studies, 19, 131164.
Lucas, R. E., 1978, Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy, Econometrica, 46, 14291446.
Lucas, R. E., 2007, Central Banking: Is Science Replacing Art, in Monetary Policy: A Journey from Theory to
Practice. European Central Bank.
Newey, W. R., and K. D. West, 1987, A Simple Positive Semi-Denite, Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation
Consistent Covariance Matrix, Econometrica, 55, 703708.
Pan, J., 2002, The Jump-Risk Premia Implicit in Options: Evidence from an Integrated Time-Series Study,
Journal of Financial Economics, 63, 350.
41Pesaran, H., and Y. Shin, 1998, Generalized Impulse Response Functions in Linear Multivariate Models, Eco-
nomic Letters, 59, 1729.
Piazzesi, M., 2005, Bond Yields and the Federal Reserve, Journal of Political Economy, 113, 311344.
Polson,N.,M.Johannes,andJ.Stroud,2008,LearningaboutJumpsandStochasticVolatility: FilteringStochas-
tic Differential Equations with Jumps, Review of Financial Studies (Forthcoming).
Rigobon, R., and B. Sack, 2003, Measuring the Reaction of Monetary Policy to the Stock Market, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 118, 639669.
Rudebusch, G. D., and T. Wu, 2008, A Macro-Finance Model of the Term-Structure, Monetary Policy, and the
Economy, Economic Journal, 188, 906926.
Shaliastovich, I., 2008, Learning, Condence and Option Prices, Working Paper Duke University.
Taylor,J.B., 1993,DiscretionversusPolicyRulesinPractice,Carnegie-RochesterConferenceSeriesonPublic
Policy, 39, 195214.
Veronesi, P., 2000, How Does Information Quality Affect Stock Returns?, Journal of Finance, 55, 807839.
Volcker, P., 1977, A Broader Role for Monetary Aggregates, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly
Review, pp. 2328.
Whaley, R. E., 1993, Derivatives on Market Volatility: Hedging Tools Long Overdue, Journal of Derivatives,
1, 7185.
Wonham, W. J., 1964, Some Applications of Stochastic Differential Equations to Optimal Filtering, SIAM
Journal of Control, 2, 347368.
Woodford, M., 2003, Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy, Princeton University
Press.
Appendix 1
For proving Proposition 1 we will need the following lemma.
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Now for a small interval of time  and the fact that jumps in the drift processes and Lt are independent of each
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as claimed. Note in the rst equality above we have used the independence property of the drift process and the
jump process, while in the second we have used the denition of ex = 1 + x + x2=2!. 


























Let ^ i = i   i   M0















































Since Vi;t is time homogeneous, we have Vi;t = Vi;t+ = Ci. Now collecting terms and taking the limit as


























43In vector form we can write this equality as

Diag( ^ )   

C = 1N;
whose solution is C = A 1  1N, as in the statement of the proposition. 































































which completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3: Let the second term in the variance equation be V2 = (    )0(0) 1(     ): Then,
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Similarly, let the third term in the variance equation be V3 = 2[(

  ) + (

  )]: Then we have dV3 =



















































where the second equality follows from Lemma 3, the third the denition of 
















and analogous terms for the other elements of : Now summing V;2 and V;3 provides the statement of (b).
Proof of Proposition 4 Since jjn()jj in (17) is a continuous function of  on the N dimensional simplex,
which is a compact set, it has a maximum and minimum, which we denote by jj njj and jjnjj: Therefore,
jjS1n(1)   S2n(2)jj  (jj njj   jjnjj)  jS1   S2j so that the Lipschitz condition is satised for the stock
price. Similarly, jjS n()jj2  jj njj2 S2 < (1 + jj njj2 S2), so that the growth condition holds as well.
Similarly the norm of the volatility of beliefs in (11) is bounded by jj ijj and jjijj and both conditions hold for
the beliefs processes, which completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 5: The change of measure with respect to the Brownian motions in the context of the
ltering setup has been derived in David (2008b). For brevity, we only provide the proof of the change of
measure for the jump component.


















































In the above, the second equality arises from the denition of a conditional expectation, the third because the
two jump processes are perfectly correlated, and the fourth from the moment generating function of a normal
distribution.
Appendix 2
1. SMM Estimation of the Regime Switching Jump-Diffusion Model
We start by providinghere the details of the SMM estimation procedure,which is used to estimate the model.
The procedure uses the SML methodology of Brandt and Santa-Clara (2002), which has already been extended
to to learning framework in the pure diffusion setting in David (2008b). We provide here the extension to the
case of observable jumps in the fundamental processes. Piazzesi (2005) has extended the procedure to a setting
with jump-diffusions.
Using the denition of the inferred shocks (12) we can write the variables observed by the econometrician in
(9) as perceivedby the investors as dYt
Yt = %(t)dt + 4 dWt+J4tdLt: Similarly the pricing kernel in (8) under
investors'ltrationcanbewrittenas dMt=Mt = (  (t) 2)dt M d ~ Wt (eY2t 1)dLt; wherethereal rate
45in the economy,  (t); is the expected value of t in (6) conditional on investors' ltration. Since fundamentals
are stationary in growth rates, we start by dening logs of variables: yt = log(Yt); and mt = log(Mt): Using
these characterizations we can write




4))dt + 4 d ~ Wt + J4tdLt; (34)




M)dt   M d ~ Wt   (eY2t   1)dLt; (35)
where diag(x) is a column vector composed of the diagonal elements of a square matrix x. It is immediate that
investors' beliefs t completely capture the state of the system (yt;mt) for forecasting future growth rates. The
specication of the system is completed with the belief dynamics in (10).
The econometrician has data series fyt1;yt2;;ytKg: Let 	 be the set of parameters of the model. Let




where p(ytk+1   ytk;tk+1jtk;tk;	) is the marginal density of fundamentals at time tk+1 conditional on in-






where the expectation is over all sample paths for the fundamentals, ~ yt; such that ~ ytk = ytk; k = 1;;K: In
general, along each path, the sequence of beliefs ftkg will be different.
As a rst step, we needto calculate p(ytk+1 ytk;tk+1jtk;tk;	): FollowingBrandt andSanta-Clara (2002),
we simulate paths of the state variables over smaller discrete units of time using the Euler discretization scheme
(see also Kloeden and Platen 1992):







h~ 2t + 1~ ut<h~ 2t; (37)






h~ 1t + 1~ u<h~ 2t; (38)
t+h   t = (t)h + (t)
p
h~ 1t; (39)
where ~ 1t and ~ 2t are 5- and 1- dimensional standard normal variables, respectively, ~ ut is uniformly distributed,
and h = 1=M is the discretization interval. The Euler scheme implies that the marginal conditional density of
the 4  1 fundamental growth vector yt over h is 4-dimensional normal.
We approximate p(j) with the density pM(j); which obtains when the state variables are discretized over
M subintervals. Since the drift and volatility coefcients of the state variables in (10), and (34) to (35) are
innitely differentiable, and 0 is positive denite, Lemma 1 in Brandt and Santa-Clara (2002) implies that
pM(j) ! p(j) as M ! 1: The Chapman-Kolmogorov equation implies that the density over the interval






 pM (y   ytk;;m;tk + (M   1)hjtk;tk) d dy; (40)
where (y; ); denotes the mixture-of-normalsdensity given as:
(y; ) = N(%(t)h;40
4h) with probability h; (41)
= N(%(t)h + (0;1;0;0)01;40
4h + i22
1) with probability 1   h; (42)

















The Strong Law of Large Numbers (SLLN) implies that ^ pM ! pM as L ! 1:
To compute the expectation in (36), we simulate S paths of the system (37) to (39) through the full time
series of fundamentals. Each path is started with an initial belief, t0 = ; the stationary beliefs implied by
the generator matrix : In each time interval (tk;tk+1) we simulate (M-1) successive values of ~ y
(s)
t using the
discrete scheme in (37), and set ~ y
(s)
tk = ytk: The results in the paper use M = 90 for quarterly data, so that
shocks are approximatedat roughly a daily frequency. The pricing kernel and beliefs along the entire path of the















where ^ pM(j) is the density approximatedin (43). The SLLN implies that ^ L(S)(	) ! E[L(	)] as S ! 1: We




tk ; which is the econometrician's expectation of investors' belief at tk:
To extract investors' beliefs from data on price levels and volatilities in addition to fundamentals we add
overidentifying moments to the SML method above. From Proposition 1, we can compute the time series of
model-implied price-earning ratios and bond yields at the discrete data points tk; k = 1;;K as
d P/Etk = C   tk; b itk() =  
1

log(B ()   tk):
We note that the constants Cs and the functions B () both depend on the parameters of the fundamental pro-




d P/Etk   P/Etk;b itk (0:25)   itk (0:25);(b itk (5)  b itk (1))   (itk (5)   itk (1))

:





b Vtk   Vtk; \ (P=C)tk   (P=C)tk

;
where V is the ATMIV, and P=C is the put-call ratio as discussed. The model-implied options prices are calcu-
lated using Monte-Carlo simulations as described below.




















The moments used are the scores of the log likelihood function from fundamentals, and the pricing errors from
stock, Treasury bond, and options prices. Since the number of scores in
@ log(^ L)
@	 (tk) equals the number of
parameters driving the fundamental processes in 	, and the number of pricing errors is ve, the statistic c in
(45) has a chi-squared distribution with ve degrees of freedom. We correct the variance covariance matrix
for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West method [see, for example, Hamilton (1994)
equation 14.1.19] using a lag length of q = 12: A long lag length is chosen since interest rates and P/E ratios
used in the error terms are highly persistent processes.
47We end the description of our estimation methodology with two important details. First, for determining the
numberofspeciedregimeswedonotuselikelihoodratiotests, whicharecomputationallyextremelydemanding
and beyond the scope of this paper (see Garcia (1998)). Instead, we follow the simpler and more practical
methodology of using the overidentied SMM objective to determine a stopping rule on the number of regimes
used in a number of papers modeling regimes shifts (e.g. Gray (1996), Bansal and Zhou (2002)). Second, to
reduce the number of parameters, we follow a two-step procedure. First we estimate an unrestricted generator
matrix and rank all its elements into 7 bins. All elements in the smallest bin (whose values we estimated to be
below 0.001) were set to zero. Elements in each of the remainingbins were constrainedto be equal in our second
step estimation.
2. Options Prices
As for the likelihood function we formulate options prices as expected discounted values of their terminal
payoffs under the risk-neutral measure. Expectations are approximated using Monte Carlo simulation while



















































1t and ~ 
2t are 5- and 1- dimensional standard normal variables, respectively, ~ ut is uniformly distributed,
and h = 1=M is the discretization interval. On each sample the process for the state variables is simulated
starting with 
(s)
t = t; the assumed beliefs of investors at time t: Then the value of a European call option at















We report option prices for M = 90: To reduce the time of computations we use three variance reduction
techniques: the rst two, antithetic and control variate (with Black-Scholes prices), are well known. In addition,
we use the expected martingale simulation technique of Duan et. al. The volatility forecast under the Q-measure














Similarly, using the discretized beliefs processes as in (39), volatility forecasts under the objective measure














h: (50)Table 1: Parameter Estimates of Regime Switching Model From SMM Procedure
Fundamental Drifts 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
-0.002 0.015 0.065 0.091 -0.057 -0.052 0.061 0.077
(0.003) (0.008) (0.021) (.005) (0.002) (0.007) (.007) (0.012)
1 2 3 4 !1 !2 !3 !4
- 0.066 -0.025 0.01 0.086 -0.057 -0.031 0.012 0.052
(0.010) (0.008) (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.015) (0.007) (.005)
Fundamental Volatilities: Q;1 E;2 K;1 K;4 H;5
0.025 0.084 0.047 0.056 0.049
(0.012) (0.036) ( 0.017) (0.016) (0.021)
Interest Rate Rule: 0  
0.017 0.362 0.257
(0.008) (0.017) (0.003)
Prices of Risk: M;1 M;2 M;3 M;4 M;5
0.045 0.421 0.300 0.3381 -0.045
(0.129) (0.201) (0.111) (0.149) (0.078)
Jump Parameters:  1 1 2 2
0.432 -0.052 0.036 0.293 -0.790
(0.195) (0.027) (0.016) (0.133) (0.364)
Generator Elements: 1 2 3 4 5 6
0.005 0.018 0.043 0.051 0.097 0.199
(0.002) (0.011) (0.007) (0.003) (0.023) (0.007)
SMM Error Value (
2(7)): 10.470 P-Value: 0.063
The table reports SMM estimates of the following model for CPI, Qt, real earnings, Et; the real pricing kernel, Mt; de-meaned
capacity utilization, and real money growth:
dQt
Qt
= t dt + Q dWt;
dEt
Et




= ( t   2)dt   M dWt + (e
Y2t   1)dLt;
dKt = t dt + K dWt;
dHt
Ht
= !t dt + H dWt:
Wt is a 5  1 vector of Standard Brownian Motions, Lt is the counter of a Poisson process with constant intensity , and Yit
i.i.d. N(i;i); i = 1;2. The drift of the stacked state vector t = (t;t   1; t   2;t;!t)
0 ; follows an eight-state
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The pricing kernel, Mt is observed by investors but not by the econometrician. Investors beliefs about the underlying drift states
follow the ltering equation in (10). Estimates are obtained from data on the fundamentals as well ve price series listed in Table 3
using the SMM methodology described in Appendix 2. Standard errors are in parentheses.Table 2: Model Implied Transition Probabilities, Stationary Probabilities, Stock and Bond Price Valu-
ations, Fear Indices, and Higher Moments in the Eight States
Implied Annual Quarterly Transition Probability (Percent) Matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 80:1 0:3 16:2 0:0 1:6 0:5 0:4 0:8
2 0:2 71:9 7:5 14:9 0:0 0:6 4:5 0:4
3 0:4 3:3 82:8 0:3 0:0 0:6 4:3 8:2
4 0:2 14:9 0:8 79:4 0:0 0:3 4:5 0:0
5 0:5 0:0 0:5 0:0 98:4 0:4 0:0 0:0
6 7:7 3:5 1:3 3:6 0:0 75:7 0:2 7:9
7 8:2 0:2 0:8 0:2 0:1 7:7 82:4 0:4
8 3:6 0:2 8:6 0:0 0:0 0:0 0:2 87:4
Implied 5-Year Transition Probability (Percent) Matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 34:7 3:6 37:8 1:3 5:2 2:0 5:1 10:3
2 3:7 30:1 16:8 27:0 0:1 3:5 13:6 5:0
3 5:2 7:3 46:1 3:5 0:2 3:3 11:4 23:0
4 3:4 27:0 8:3 42:2 0:1 3:1 14:0 1:9
5 2:0 0:33 2:6 0:22 92:3 1:5 0:3 0:9
6 16:4 8:9 14:9 9:6 1:0 25:6 3:5 20:0
7 21:4 2:6 11:4 2:3 1:2 15:5 39:3 6:2
8 9:7 2:2 26:7 0:7 0:6 0:8 3:2 56:1
Implied Stationary Probabilities, P/E Ratios, the Term Structure,
Option Prices, and Higher Order Moments
# (%)  (%) (%) !(%)  (%) P/E i0:25(%) S(%) ATM(%) P/C Skw Kur SV (%)
1 1:5 6:1 1:0 1:2 11:0 17:3 4:3 1:5 15:2 1:29  1:9 9:4  71:1
2 6:5  5:2 1:0 5:3 7:6 8:9 10:9  0:1 33:0 0:90 1:0 4:7 96:4
3 6:5 6:1 8:7 1:2 25:8 14:5 12:6  1:9 16:3 1:21  1:1 6:6  78:3
4 9:1  5:2  2:5  5:7 6:9 7:9 13:4  1:1 41:6 0:76 1:4 5:1 99:1
5 1:5 7:7 1:0  3:1 12:1 32:0 4:1 0:1 22:8 1:31  2:3 10:8  88:0
6  0:2  5:7  6:6 5:3 4:8 12:9 0:1 2:3 21:5 0:98  0:3 5:9 83:5
7 6:5  5:2  6:6  3:1 10:5 11:4 8:7  1:3 24:2 0:93 0:8 4:3 95:7
8 1:5 6:1  6:6 5:3 21:2 19:7 2:3 1:3 17:5 1:34  3:3 21:5  92:2
The top and middle panels report the quarterly and 5-year implied transition probability matrix between the eight states implied
from the generator matrix elements displayed in Table 1. Rows may not sum to one due to rounding. The bottom panel report
the implied stationary probabilities and implied prices of the variables used in the SMM estimation procedure in the eight states.
  is the stationary probability of each state; P/E the price-earnings ratio, and, i0:25; the 3-month Treasury yield, and S the 5-year
less 1-year Treasury yield; ATM is the at-the-money implied volatility (ATMIV); P/C is the ratio of 5% OTM put-to-call implied
volatilities; Skw and Kur are the skewness and kurtosis of the 3-month risk-neutral return distribution, respectively; SV is the
correlation between stock returns and stock variance calculated using (23). The P/E ratio and bond yields are computed as shown
in Proposition 1. Implied Volatility, Put-Call Ratio and the higher order moments are for options with three months to maturity as
calculated using Monte Carlo simulations as shown in Appendix 2.Table 3: Model Fits for Expected Fundamentals, Stocks, Bonds, and Options Prices from SMM Proce-
dure
Variable   R
2
Ination -0.009 1.638 0.623
[-1.538] [8.071]

Real Earnings Growth -0.045 2.099 0.159
[ -1.501] [3.617]

De-Meaned Capacity Utilization 0.002 1.353 0.751
[0.068] [13.540]

Real Money Growth -0.005 2.15 0.365
[-1.785] [5.957]

P/E Ratio -3.028 1.249 0.606
[ -1.915] [19.976]

3-Month Yield -0.002 0.970 0.535
[-0.246] [5.991]





ATM 0.004 0.913 0.502
[1.522] [5.539]





We display the ts of the variables used in our SMM procedure: the fundamentals, and the
ve pricing variables, which are used to overidentify the model. For the four fundamentals
we provide the regression results for the equation x(t) =  + 
￿ [xjFt 1] + (t); where
x(t) is the realized growth and
￿ [xjFt] is investors' conditional expected growth of the
fundamental under consideration. The conditional expected growth is obtained from the
ltered probabilities (t) displayed in Figure 3, and for earnings, for example, is given
by
PN
i i i(t): For the price series, we present the regression results for the equation
p(t) =  +  p((t)) + (t); where p(t) and p((t)) are the realized and model price
conditional on investors' beliefs at t, respectively. T-statistics are in parenthesis and are
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.Table 4: Explaining At-The-Money Implied Volatility of 3-Month S&P 500 Options (1986:Q2  2008)
No. Constant ATMIV




1 1:769 0:91 0:528
[0:454] [3:977]













5 18:107  0:655 0:045
[15:277]
 [ 1:719]












9 13:781 0:343  0:035  0:275  0:035  2:128 0:361
[2:618]
 [2:159]
 [ 0:151] [ 1:486] [ 0:882] [ 7:376]

10  2:002 0:990 0:089 0:760 0:098 0:000  1:238 0:609
[ 0:518] [3:276]
 [0:508] [2:754]
 [0:4972] [0:020] [ 3:065]





 [0:580] [0:550] [ 3:169]

The table reports the quarterly time series regressions
ATMIV(t) = 0 + 1 ATMIV
M(t   1) + 2 ATMIV(t   1) + +3 P/E(t   1) + 4 C.U.(t   1)
+ 5 Earn(t   1) + 6 NBER(t   1) + 7 R
 
t 1 + (t):
In different lines some of the i are set to zero. ATM(t) is the at-the-money Black-Scholes implied volatility on S&P 500 index options
traded on the CBOE with approximately three months to maturity and trading at the beginning of the quarter. ATM
M is the at-the-money
implied volatility implied by our model and calculated as shown in Appendix 2. The historical and model implied series are shown in the
top panel of Figure 1. The latter are calculated conditional on investors' beliefs of fundamental drift states that are extracted and displayed
in Figure 3. P/E is the price to operating income ratio of S&P 500 rms, CU is the demeaned industrial capacity utilization in the United
States obtained from the Federal Reserve Board, Earn stands for the real operating earnings growth of S&P 500 rms, NBER is 100 times
the quarterly expansion indicator created by the NBER, and R
  is percentage one quarter lagged returns in periods when it is negative on
the S&P 500 index. Besides options prices, all other variables are measured at the end of the previous quarter. T-Statistics are in parenthesis
and are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using the Newey and West (1987) method. The symbol * indicates statistical
signicance at the 5% level.Table 5: Explaining the Ratio of Implied Volatilities of 5% Out-of-the-Money Puts to Calls for 3-Month S&P 500 Options (1986:Q2  2008)
No. Constant P/C
M Lag P/E CU Earn NBER R
 
t 1 COT II  R
2













4 1:466  0:01 0:041
[9:536]
 [ 1:344]
5 1:297 0:015 0:048
[37:324]
 [1:780]












9 1:267  0:901 0:008
[27:522]
 [ 0:760]
10 53:99  2:262 0:044
[30:724]
 [ 1:488]
11 1:499  0:006  0:004 0:01 0 0:041 0:357  0:004 0:219
[10:53] [ 1:145] [ 0:453] [1:315] [0:047] [4:846]
 [0:399] [ 2:530]





 [0:539] [1:089] [2:311]
 [0:897] [ 1:973]





 [0:126] [1:447] [1:952] [1:325] [ 2:031]

The table reports the quarterly time series regressions
P/C(t) = 0 + 1 P/C
M(t   1) + 2 P/C(t   1) + 3 P/E(t   1) + 4 C:U:(t   1)
+ 5 Earn(t   1) + 6 NBER(t   1) + 7 R
 
t 1 + 8 COT(t) + +8 II(t)(t):
In different lines some of the i are set to zero. P/C(t) is the ratio of Black-Scholes implied volatilities of 5% out-of-the-money puts to calls for S&P 500 options with
about three months to maturity measured at the beginning of the quarter. P/E
M is the analogous put-call ratio implied by our model and calculated as shown in Appendix
2. The historical and model implied series are shown in the top panel of Figure 1. The latter are calculated conditional on investors' beliefs of fundamental drift states that
are extracted and displayed in Figure 3. P/E is the price to operating income ratio of S&P 500 500 rms; CU is the demeaned industrial capacity utilization in the United
States obtained from the Federal Reserve Board; Earn stands for the real operating earnings growth of S&P rms; NBER is 100 times the quarterly expansion indicator
created by the NBER; R
 
t 1 is the one quarter lagged returns in periods when it is negative on the S&P 500 index; COT stands for the sentiment of traders measured as the
net long position of large speculators on S&P 500 index futures obtained from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission's Commitment of Traders Report; II stands
for investor sentiment (bullish less bearish proportion) measured in Investor's Intelligence's survey of investment newsletter writers. Besides options prices and sentiment
variables, all other variables are measured at the end of the previous quarter. COT is measured on the day of the options trade, and the II on the Wednesday before the
options trade. T-Statistics are in parenthesis and are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using the Newey and West (1987) method. The symbol * indicates
statistical signicance at the 5% level.Table 6: Model Volatility of Stock Volatility and Fundamental Uncertainties (1986:Q2  2008)
No. Constant Inf Unc Earn Unc CU Unc MG Unc  R
2
1. 2.046 0.646 0.054
(1.535) (1.817)
2. 0.933 0.346 0.725
(1.554) (8.347)

3. 1.767 0.677 0.037
(1.023) (1.729)
4. -0.226 1.952 0.234
(-0.143) (2.553)






The table reports the quarterly time series regressions
VV(t) = 0 + 1 IU(t) + 2 EU(t) + 3 CU(t) + 4 MG(t) + (t): (51)
In different lines some of the i are set to zero. Inf Unc stands for ination uncertainty, Earn Unc for
earnings uncertainty, CU Unc for Capacity Utilization uncertainty, and MG Unc for money growth
uncertainty. Uncertainty for each fundamental variable is measured using equation (33) and the mod-
els volatilityof stock volatility iscomputed using (22). Time series of all variables are evaluated at the
ltered belief series in Figure 3. T-Statistics are in parenthesis and are adjusted for heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation using the Newey and West (1987) method. The symbol * indicates statistical
signicance at the 5% level.Figure 1: Data and Model Fitted At-the-Money Implied Volatility (ATMIV) and 5% Out-of-the-Money
Put-Call Implied Volatility Ratio (P/C) from (1986:Q2-2008)































Put -Call Implied Volatility Ratio
M
D
The at-the-money implied volatility (ATMIV) and ratio of 5% OTM put-to-call implied volatilities (P/C) at about three
months to maturity are constructed at a quarterly frequency from S&P 500 index options prices as discussed in Section 2.2.
The legend D denotes the historical data series, while M denotes those from our model. The model series are calculated
using Monte Carlo simulations as shown in Appendix 2. The ltered beliefs series of investors used to generate the tted
values are shown in Figure 3. Shaded areas represent NBER-dated recessions.Figure 2: Impulse Responses of Short Rates and Industrial Capacity Utilization to Shocks to Fear
Measures (1986:Q2-2008)






Response of Short Rate to ATMIV HData L








Response of Short Rate to ATMIV HModel L









Response of Short Rate to P C HData L









Response of Short Rate to P C HModel L









Response of CU to ATMIV HData L






Response of CU to ATMIV HModel L










Response of CU to P C HData L









Response of CU to P C HModel L
We report the generalized impulse response function (IRF) of Pesaran and Shin (1998) for the 1st order VAR system with the
two variables in each panel. The IRF using this denition is independent of the order of variables in the VAR. Two standard
error bands using bootstrap with 5000 repetitions are also displayed.Figure 3: Conditional Probabilities of Eight Regimes (1967-2008)
















State 1 : Regular Boom














State 2 : Mild Recession















State 3 : Overheating Boom















State 4 : Stagflation















State 5 : New Economy Growth













State 6 : Deflation
















State 7 : Deep Recession














State 8 : Low Capacity Boom
The regime denitions are in Table 2. , ; , and ! are the drifts of ination, earnings growth, de-meaned capacity
utilization, and real money growth, respectively. The ltered beliefs are obtained from the SMM procedure in Appendix 2.
The calibrated values of the parameters are shown in Table 1. Shaded areas represent NBER-dated recessions.Figure 4: Fundamentals: Empirical and Model Fitted (1960-2008)



































































Historical values of nancial and fundamental variables series (D) are in solid lines and their tted values (M) from the SMM
estimation procedure in Appendix B are in dashed lines. The calibrated values of the parameters are shown in Table 1. The
ltered beliefs series of investors used to generate the tted values are shown in Figure 3. Shaded areas represent NBER-dated
recessions.Figure 5: Stock and Bond Prices: Empirical and Model Fitted (1960-2008)





















3 -Month Treasury Yield
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5 -Year - 1 -Year Treasury Yield HSlope L
M
D
Historical values of nancial and fundamental variables series (D) are in solid lines and their tted values (M) from the SMM
estimation procedure in the Appendix are in dashed lines. The estimated values of the parameters are shown in Table 1 and
the implied asset price valuations are in Table 2 The ltered beliefs series of investors used to generate the tted values are
shown in Figure 3. Shaded areas represent NBER-dated recessions.Figure 6: Strike-Adjusted 3-Month Densities of Stock Returns Under the Risk-Neutral Measures in the
Eight Regimes

























Stock return risk-neutral densities conditional on investors having 80 percent probability of each of the eight regimes (and
equal probabilities for the other regimes) are calculated using our estimated model parameters in Table 1 using Monte Carlo
simulations as shown in Appendix 2.Figure 7: Relationship Between Fear Indices and Policy Variables From Kernel Regressions














ATMIV and Expected Money Growth H1986 : Q2 - 2008 : Q4 L










P C and Expected Money Growth H1986 : 2 - 2008 : Q3 L












Model ATM and Capacity Utilization H1967 - 2008 L









Model P C and Capacity Utilization H1967 - 2008 L
Data and model expected fundamentals are shown in Figure 4. The at-the-money implied volatility (ATMIV) and the ratio of
5% OTM put-to-call implied volatilities (P/C) at about three months to maturity is constructed at a quarterly frequency from
S&P 500 index options prices as discussed in Section 2.2. The model option price series are calculated using Monte Carlo
simulations as shown in Appendix 2. The ltered beliefs series of investors used to generate the tted values are shown in
Figure 3. The tted lines from the nonparametric regressions are estimated with a Gaussian kernel [see e.g. Campbell, Lo,
and MacKinlay (1997)].Figure 8: Relationship Between ATMIV and Money Growth During Stimulative Periods























Data , Stimulative Periods
Correlation = -0.47 H-2.29 L
























Model , Stimulative Periods
Correlation = -0.64 H-3.70 L
We dene Stimulative periods as those where the 3-month Treasury Bill Yield is below the annualized ination (CPI) rate.
In the sub-sample of our date where we have options data (1986:2  2008) there are 20 quarters that we characterize as
stimulative. The panels report the sample correlation and its t.statistic in parenthesis. The at-the-money implied volatility
(ATMIV) at about three months to maturity is constructed at a quarterly frequency from S&P 500 index options prices as
discussed in Section 2.2. The model series are calculated using Monte Carlo simulations as shown in Appendix 2. The ltered
beliefs series of investors used to generate the tted values are shown in Figure 3.Figure 9: Relationship BetweenATMImplied Volatility andAbsolute Changes in ATMImplied Volatil-
ity, (1986:Q2-2008)






























Vol . and Absolute Changes in ATMIV . HData L
Correlation = 0.41 H4.27 L





























Vol . and Absolute Changes in ATMIV . HModel L
Correlation = 0.49 H5.35 L






























Vol . of Vol and Absolute Changes in ATMIV . HData L
Correlation = 0.34 H3.42 L





























Vol . of Vol. and Absolute Changes in ATMIV . HModel L
Correlation = 0.61 H7.33 L
Data and model ATM implied volatility are shown in the top panel of Figure 1. The model volatility of volatility is computed
using (22) and the ltered belief series in Figure 3.Figure 10: Volatility Premium (1986:Q2-2008)
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Model IVP and FVRP H1986 : Q2 - 2008 L
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Model IVP and Log Vol of Vol .
VV
IVP
The rst and second panels show the data implied volatility premiums (IVP), which are the difference between the ATMIV
in Figure 1 and the P-measure forecast of realized volatility from from Projection 1 (equation (26)) and Projection 2 (equation
(27)), respectively. The panels also show the analogous implied volatility premium from our model which is the difference
between the model implied volatility in Figure 1 and the model forecast of volatility under the P-measure using simulation
methods asdescribed inequation (50) inAppendix 2. The thirdpanel shows the IVPand the ForwardVolatility RiskPremium
(FVRP) from our model. The FVRP is the difference in volatility forecasts under the Q- and P-measures respectively. The
fourth panel shows the model's IVP and volatility of volatility series as computed using (22). All model variables are
computed using the ltered belief series in Figure 3.Figure 11: Volatility of Stock Market Volatility and Fundamental Uncertainties (1986:Q2-2008)
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Cap . Util . Uncertainty and Vol . of Vol .
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VV
The model volatility of volatility is computed using (22) and fundamental RMSE uncertainties are computed using (33). All
variables are computed using the ltered belief series in Figure 3.